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I. INTRODUCTION
With ever-widening state budget deficits and tax revenue steadily on the
decline, the majority of states have been faced with the prospect of deepening
spending cuts and increasing taxes in order to generate much-needed revenue.1
Neither has been popular with the electorate. 2 Some state governments,
1 See NICHOLAS JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, AN UPDATE
ON STATE BUDGET CUTS: AT LEAST 46 STATES HAVE IMPOSED CUTS THAT HURT
VULNERABLE RESIDENTS AND CAUSE JOB Loss (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/
files/3-13-08sfp.pdf. For a more current update on state budget deficits, see PHIL OLIFF ET
AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION'S IMPACT
(June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf ("As a new fiscal year begins, the
latest state budget estimates continue to show that states' ability to fund services remains
hobbled by slow economic growth. The budget gaps that states have had to close for fiscal
year 2013 . . . total $55 billion in 31 states.").
2 See, e.g., THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, CHANGING VIEWS
OF FEDERAL SPENDING: FEWER WANT SPENDING TO GROW, BUT MOST CUTS REMAIN
UNPOPULAR 1 (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.people-press.org/2011/02/10/files/2011/02/
702.pdf ("The survey also shows that the public is reluctant to cut spending-or raise
taxes-to balance state budgets.").
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however, have tapped a far less controversial source of revenue to boost state
coffers: unclaimed property. 3
Traditionally, recovering unclaimed property was of low priority to states.4
More recently, however, states have recognized the potential revenue stream
derived from collecting this property, as well as the fines and penalties that can
be assessed on companies for noncompliance with reporting requirements.5
Accordingly, many states have stepped up enforcement of their unclaimed
property statutes, resulting in the collection of billions of dollars annually
through the seizure of property presumed to be abandoned.6 In fact, as of
January 2013, states were in possession of 41.7 billion dollars in unclaimed
property.7
Unclaimed property is generally defined as either tangible8 or intangible9
property over which a true owner has not exercised any powers of ownership
for a predetermined period of time.10 Intangible property-which lacks a
specific location or situs -generally refers to dormant accounts with
companies that have had no contact with the true owner for a predetermined
period of time. 12 The most common forms of unclaimed intangible property
include bank deposits, savings accounts, stocks, bonds, dividends, utility
deposits, refunds, travelers checks, unredeemed money orders, insurance drafts,
3 Throughout this Note, I use the terms "unclaimed" and "abandoned" property
interchangeably.
4 What Is Unclaimed Property, NAT'L Ass'N UNCLAIMED PROP. ADMINS.,
http://www.unclaimed.org/what/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Unclaimed
Property].
5 TRACEY L. REID, UNCLAIMED PROPERTY: A REPORTING PROCESS AND AUDIT
SURVIVAL GUIDE 13 (2008) ("If the property is not turned over . . , the holder can be subject
to late reporting and nonreporting fines and penalties, which can double and even quadruple
the amount of money that the holder should have reported initially.").
6 Scott Thurm & Pui-Wing Tam, States Scooping up Assets from Millions of
Americans: 'Unclaimed Property'Fattens Public Coffers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4,2008, at Al.
7 Unclaimed Property, supra note 4. According to one leading commentator,
"Unclaimed property is the fastest growing source of state revenue-and it's increasing 20%
per year!" REID, supra note 5, at 3.
Some examples of tangible unclaimed property include: cash, coins, antiques,jewelry, new toys, collectibles, and musical instruments. See Unclaimed Property:
Frequently Asked Questions, PA. DEP'T TREASURY, http://www.patreasury.gov/unclaimed
propertyfaq.html#reporting (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
9 Intangible property is defined as "[p]roperty that lacks a physical existence.
Examples include stock options and business goodwill." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1336
(9th ed. 2009).
10 REID, supra note 5, at 8.
11 Situs is a Latin word meaning "[t]he location or position (of something) for legal
purposes, as in lex situs, the law of the place where the thing in issue is situated." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1513 (9th ed. 2009).
12 Unclaimed Property, supra note 4.
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uncashed payroll checks, and the unredeemed portions of stored-value cards.13
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have unclaimed property laws-
compliance with which is mandatory.14
The original purpose of unclaimed property law was to safeguard the
interests of true owners until they could come forward and reclaim their right to
control of the abandoned property.15 These laws require companies to turn over
both tangible and intangible property to the state following a statutorily
prescribed dormancy period. 16 In this way, the value of the unclaimed property
can benefit the public generally-instead of individual businesses-by
generating revenue that can be used by the state for its citizens.' 7 While some
states make a concerted effort to locate the property's true owner, on average
only one-third of these owners are located and their abandoned property
returned.' 8 At the other end of the spectrum is the state of Delaware, which
reunites true owners with only 3.4% of the unclaimed property it collects.' 9 The
benefits attendant to holding the unclaimed property obligations of owners who
fail to surface and reclaim their property are almost too obvious to state.
Aggressive state enforcement of unclaimed property laws as a means of
revenue generation raises intriguing issues concerning the fairness and equity of
the practice 20 -iSSues that cannot be swept aside completely and into which the
beginning of this Note will delve. The focus of this Note, however, rests more
narrowly on those situations when multiple states make concomitant claims to
the same unclaimed intangible property. In these instances, the proper question
is which state has the most legally cognizable right to the intangible property?
Because of the substantial and ever-increasing revenue to be derived from
securing legal claim to unclaimed property, the current dual-priority structure-
which looks first to the owner's last known address and, if unknown, then to the
13 See id.; see also Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. & David J. Epstein, Issues of Sovereignty
in Escheat and the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429, 1431
(1983).
14 REID, supra note 5, at 1.
15 Id. at 7.
'
6 Id. at 10.
17 See, e.g., Smyth v. Carter, 845 N.E.2d 219, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also REID,
supra note 5, at 7 ("The theory is that if property is lost, the general public should benefit
from the use of that property until the true owner can be found, rather than letting one
individual business reap the benefit of a windfall that does not actually belong to them.").
I8 Thurm & Tam, supra note 6.
19 David Bogoslaw, Cashing in on Unclaimed Property: State Controllers and the U.S.
Treasury Hold Billions in Unclaimed Assets, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 27, 2009,
6:30 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30945297/ns/business-us-business/t/cashing-
unclaimed-property/ (noting that since 1993, Delaware has returned only $109 million out of
a total of $3.24 billion in unclaimed property).
20 For an interesting discussion of the substantive due process implications of modem
escheat statutes, see Teagan J. Gregory, Note, Unclaimed Property and Due Process:
Justifying "Revenue-Raising" Modern Escheat, 110 MICH. L. REv. 319 (2011).
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state of the debtor company's corporate domicile21 -no longer provides an
equitable and easily administrable framework from which to resolve interstate
disputes. More accurately, the current framework too often and inequitably
allows the state in which the debtor happened to incorporate to reap the
financial benefit of intangible property obligations incurred all over the country.
This Note argues that Congress should accept the Supreme Court's repeated
invitations and craft a uniform legislative framework governing the resolution
of interstate disputes over the custody of unclaimed intangible property. This
proposed framework would modify the dual-priority scheme articulated by the
Supreme Court in Texas v. New Jersey and would afford the jurisdiction in
which the transaction that gave rise to the intangible property occurred the
benefit of custodial escheat in the event that the owner's last known address is
not maintained.
Part II of this Note provides relevant background information on unclaimed
property law, underscoring its recent migration away from a means of reuniting
a true owner with her intangible property, and toward its use as a tool for
aggressive revenue generation by states facing significant budget shortfalls. Part
III presents the Supreme Court's current dual-priority, interstate escheat
framework-as articulated in Texas and subsequently reaffirmed in
Pennsylvania v. New York 22 and Delaware v. New York23-suggesting that this
archaic judicial scheme is no longer workable as an effective and equitable
vehicle for reuniting a true owner with her lost intangible property. This section
also critically assesses the constitutionality of the so-called "third-priority
rule"-the most prevalent attempt by states to carve out an exception to the
Court's dual-priority framework-and concludes that state attempts to alter the
Court's framework to prioritize the location of the transaction that gave rise to
the intangible property are preempted by federal common law. Because federal
preemption effectively forecloses a state-level solution and the Supreme Court
is unlikely to reconsider Texas and its progeny, it is incumbent upon Congress
to craft a legislative solution to correct the iniquities that plague the current
framework. Part IV proposes a *workable congressional framework that
maintains the spirit of the Court's holding in Texas by preserving the opinion's
twin principles of equity and ease of administration.
II. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY-ITS ORIGINS AND THE LAw GOVERNING ITS
COLLECTION
This Note focuses on the more recent developments in unclaimed property
law; however, any logical discussion of the recent trends in an area of the law
must necessarily include its historical underpinnings. Therefore, this Note
21 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 682 (1965).
22407 U.S. 206, 214 (1972).
23 507 U.S. 490, 507 (1993).
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begins with the origins of modem unclaimed property law. Section A briefly
discusses the English common law origins of unclaimed property and the
subsequent American adaptation of these ancient doctrines. 24 Section B presents
the first major attempt at interstate uniformity within modem unclaimed
property law: the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws' (NCCUSL) 1954 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.
Although gradually reducing the impediments to state escheat of unclaimed
property-largely a response to this growing trend among states-the language
and commentary of each version of the Act suggest a continued adherence to
the central tenet of reuniting true owner and lost property. Finally, section C
focuses on unclaimed property law's more recent use as an instrument of state
revenue generation, arguing that the overwhelming trend among the states of
leveraging their laws to raise tax-free revenue undercuts the law's purpose of
efficient reunification of true owner and abandoned property.
A. Unclaimed Property's Origins in the English Doctrines ofEscheat
and Bona Vacantia
Modem unclaimed property laws are rooted in the English common law
doctrines of escheat and bona vacantia.25 Historically, under the doctrine of
escheat, 26 when a tenant died without heirs, any unowned real property passed
to the tenant's feudal lord.27 In the event that the feudal lord could not be
identified, or if the Crown was the original owner in fee, the property escheated
to the sovereign. 28 With the abolition of subinfeudation in 1290,29 the
justification for escheat became one of royal prerogative-abandoning the more
traditional justification of continuing necessary services to a tenant's lord.30
24 For a more comprehensive history of the derivation of modem unclaimed property
laws, including their roots in English common law, see Note, Origins and Development of
Modern Escheat, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1319-20 (1961) [hereinafter Origins of Modern
Escheat], as well as David C. Auten, Note, Modern Rationales of Escheat, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 95 (1963), and Susan T. Kelly, Note, Unclaimed Billions: Federal Encroachment on
States'Rights in Abandoned Property, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1037 (1992).
25 See McThenia & Epstein, supra note 13, at 1430-31; Kelly, supra note 24, at 1041.
26 Escheat is defined as "[r]eversion of property (esp. real property) to the state upon
the death of an owner who has neither a will nor any legal heirs." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 623 (9th ed. 2009).27 Origins of Modern Escheat, supra note 24, at 1319-20.28 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 13, at 1430. Escheat was originally developed by
the courts in order to ensure continued performance of services to the lord as consideration
for the grant of land ownership from the lord to the tenant. 1 DAVID J. EPSTEIN ET AL.,
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LAW AND REPORTING FORMS § 1.01 (1987). When a tenant died
without an heir, no member of his line was capable of continuing performance of the
required services. Therefore, the land reverted to the tenant's lord. Id.
29 Statute of Quia Emptores, 1290, 18 Edw., cc. 1-3 (Eng.).30 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, § 1.01.
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Because escheat only applied to real property, the complementary doctrine
of bona vacantia31 emerged to apply to personal property.32 This doctrine was
premised on the belief that the sovereign had a more equitable right to
unclaimed personal property than a stranger and that by taking possession of the
property, the sovereign would minimize disputes between private parties over
the right of possession.33 Bona vacantia is distinguishable from escheat because
the sovereign's claim to the personalty was based on the absence of any other
owner, rather than simply its status as ultimate owner.34 Furthermore, collecting
unclaimed personalty under the doctrine of bona vacantia was, at least initially,
custodial, whereas traditional escheat vested immediate ownership in the
sovereign.35
Following the Revolutionary War, the doctrines of escheat and bona
vacantia were assimilated into American law, and these sovereign rights were
reserved with the states.36 The American doctrine that emerged was a unified
version of both escheat and bona vacantia37 and did not closely resemble the
3 1 Bona vacantia is defined as "[p]roperty not disposed of by a decedent's will and to
which no relative is entitled under intestacy laws." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 199 (9th ed.
2009). Bona vacantia most frequently resulted when the owner of personal property died
without an heir to claim the property. Consequently, it either belonged to the finder of the
personalty or escheated to the sovereign. Id.
32 Origins ofModern Escheat, supra note 24, at 1326.
3 3 d. at 1326-27. Bona vacantia should also be distinguished from treasure trove,
which consists of "coin or money concealed in the earth or other private place," where the
true owner of the property is unknown. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, § 1.03. Under
traditional property law, most lost property could be claimed by the finder against all but the
true owner. By contrast, possession of lost property deemed treasure trove, once discovered,
vested in the sovereign by royal prerogative. Id.
34 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, § 1.02.
35 Cary B. Hall, Note, Escheat? Gesundheit. But for States, It's Nothing to Sneeze at:
Delaware v. New York, 113 S. Ct. 1550 (1993), 5 U. MIAMi Bus. L.J. 79, 80-81 (1993).
36 Kelly, supra note 24, at 1041. The Supreme Court first upheld the constitutionality of
a state law regulating the escheat of an intestate decedent's real property in 1896. See
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, § 1.04[3] (citing Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256, 263
(1896)) ("[I]n this country, when the title to land fails for want of heirs and devisees[,] it
escheats to the State as part of its common ownership, either by mere operation of law, or
upon an inquest of office, according to the law of the particular State."); see also
Christianson v. King Cnty., 239 U.S. 356, 365 (1915) ("The distribution of and the right of
succession to the estates of deceased persons are matters exclusively of state cognizance, and
are such as were within the competence of the territorial legislature to deal with as it saw fit,
in the absence of an inhibition by Congress.").
37 Kelly, supra note 24, at 1042. The authority to enact escheat legislation was derived
from the states "as the successors to the prerogative of royal sovereignty." EPSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 28, § 1.04[1]. Because bona vacantia was not derived from royal prerogative, but
rather because of the absence of the true owner to claim possession of the property, the
states' assumption of this doctrine was justified under their inherent police power. Id
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archaic doctrines from which it was derived.38 By the nineteenth century, many
states had passed escheat statutes to deal with the distribution of real property to
the state,39 and toward the end of the century, state statutory provisions
governing the distribution of personal property began to emerge. 40 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the early twentieth century was fraught with competition
between the states acting pursuant to their unclaimed property statutes.41
Escheat in the United States has taken on a form distinct from its English
common law roots. American escheat applies to both real and personal property,
it presumes abandonment after a dormancy period has elapsed, and it is
custodial in nature.42 It is this final difference-that escheat is custodial in
nature-that validates American escheat's roots in reuniting a true owner with
her abandoned property.43 The remainder of this Part presents the NCCUSL's
38 See Kelly, supra note 24, at 1043; see also Auten, supra note 24, at 114 ("Modem
escheat law bears only superficial resemblance to its hoary ancestors; some of the rules are
the same, but the underlying reasons have necessarily changed."). The early American
adaptation of escheat differed from its traditional English counterpart predominantly in two
respects. First, with the American version of escheat, "it [was] not necessary for escheated
property to have been passed intestate. Modem statutes contain[ed] a presumption of
abandonment. . . ." Kelly, supra note 24, at 1043; see also In re People of N.Y., 138 F.
Supp. 661, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("It is a basic property rule that title must rest somewhere,
and it is a logical presumption that property unclaimed over a large number of years has
been abandoned by its owners; indeed, it is on the logic of this presumption that state escheat
laws are based. . . ."). Second, American escheat is custodial, meaning that when
"unclaimed property is remitted to the state by the holder of the property, title to the property
does not pass to the state. Instead, title remains with the owner of the abandoned property,
and the owner may reclaim the property from the state at any time." Ethan D. Millar & John
L. Coalson, Jr., The Pot of Gold at the End of the Class Action Lawsuit: Can States Claim It
as Unclaimed Property?, 70 U. PITr. L. REV. 511, 516 (2009); see also In re Linquist's
Estate, 154 P.2d 879, 887 (Cal. 1944) ("[T]itle to property distributed to the state ... does
not vest absolutely and unconditionally in the state . .. [T]he title held by the state is
conditional and subject to divestment by the appearance of legitimate claimants.").
39 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, § 1.04[3].
40 1d. In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of an
abandoned property statute that permitted the Massachusetts Attorney General to apply to
the probate court for the value of savings deposits that had been dormant for a period of
thirty years. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Escheat, Unclaimed Property, and the Supreme Court,
17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 50, 59 (1965) (citing Provident Inst. for Say. v. Malone, 221 U.S.
660 (1911)). The Court rejected the bank's argument that to presume the funds in a dormant
savings account had been abandoned, and then to subsequently confiscate these unclaimed
funds, offended due process of law. Provident Institution, 221 U.S. at 665.
41 Kelly, supra note 24, at 1053 (noting that a combination of "diverse state statutes as
well as ... multiple states claiming the same intangible property" characterized the period
leading up to the promulgation of the 1954 Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act).
42 See infra supra note 38.
43 Millar & Coalson, supra note 38, at 516 ("Instead, title remains with the owner of the
abandoned property, and the owner may reclaim the property from the state at any time. The
state thus acts as a mere custodian or conservator for the owner.").
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attempts at legislative uniformity and concludes with unclaimed property law's
recent shift toward the less noble and more pragmatic purpose of padding state
coffers.
B. An Attempt at Uniformity: The Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act
The NCCUSL has promulgated four different model acts44 that regulate the
distribution of unclaimed property,45 of which forty-four states and the District
of Columbia have adopted at least one version.46 The evolution of these acts has
traced the developments in Supreme Court case law governing interstate escheat
rules.47 The section that follows provides background on three distinct attempts
at uniformity, underscoring the NCCUSL's efforts to both accommodate
developing trends in state statutory law and to preserve unclaimed property
law's paramount purpose of reuniting an owner with her abandoned property.
In the face of widely divergent state abandoned property statutes and
inconsistent Supreme Court case law,48 the NCCUSL made its first attempt at
44 It should be noted that the NCCUSL drafts and proposes model acts, but they do not
become law until an individual state adopts them in part or in their entirety. See About the
ULC, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About
%20the%20ULC (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
45 Millar & Coalson, supra note 38, at 515.
46 REID, supra note 5, at 6 ("There are still a handful of states, including Delaware,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Texas, which have not adopted ANY form
of these Uniform Acts."). According to two commentators, "Few states still follow either the
1954 or 1966 model acts. Most states currently base their unclaimed property laws on the
Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1981 ... but at least ten states have also adopted ... the
Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1995 . . . ." Millar & Coalson, supra note 38, at 515-16.
4 7 See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT (1995), Prefatory Note, 8C U.L.A. 87 (2003) ("The
1954 Act was drafted during a period of conflicting legislation among the various States and
several Supreme Court decisions . . .. In 1965, these conflicts were resolved by the decision
in Texas v. New Jersey, which established a set of priorities for claimant States
[that] . . . were then adopted in the 1981 Act." (citation omitted)).
4 8 See McThenia & Epstein, supra note 13, at 1440. Compare Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 551 (1948) (recognizing that the rights of other parties not
represented in the case may be affected, but nevertheless concluding that "the ties thereby
established between the companies and the State were without more sufficient to validate the
jurisdiction here asserted by the Legislature"), with Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341
U.S. 428, 442 (1951) ("We think that stock certificates and undelivered dividends thereon
may also be abandoned property subject to the disposition of the domiciliary state of the
corporation when the whereabouts of the owners are unknown for such lengths of time, and
under such circumstances, as permit the declaration of abandonment."). The Supreme Court
in Standard Oil also held that more than one state escheating the same abandoned property
could not comport with due process. This revelation led to what has been termed a "race of
diligence" among the states. UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT (1981), Prefatory Note, 8C U.L.A.
151 (2003).
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uniformity with the 1954 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.49
Fundamentally grounded in the derivative rights doctrine,50 the Act's
predominant purpose was to protect a true owner's interest in her missing
property.5 ' Additionally, the commissioners-realizing the unlikelihood of an
owner actually reclaiming her property after it had been presumed abandoned-
were determined to craft a framework that was administratively simple, 52 that
relieved holders of abandoned property of the liability and responsibility
incident to maintaining possession,53 and that precluded these holders from
reaping the financial benefits derived from the continued use of the property.54
4 9 UNIF. DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 267 (1968). One
commentator has provided the following description of the 1954 version of the Act:
[I]t is custodial in nature, making the states the custodians of unclaimed property on
behalf of the true owners; . . . it is comprehensive, in that it attempted to encompass all
forms of intangible property; it was intended to be a consumer protection law; and it
created revenue enhancement for the states ....
REID, supra note 5, at 5-6.
50 See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. State, 380 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) ("[T]he
State in escheating such claims did not acquire any better or greater right to enforce the
claims than was possessed by the former owners."); see also Millar & Coalson, supra note
38, at 516 ("Th[e] [derivative rights] doctrine provides that the right of a state to take
custody of unclaimed property is derived from the rights of the owner of the property.
Accordingly, the state 'stands in the shoes' of the missing owner and acts on the owner's
behalf.").
511954 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SixTY-THIRD
YEAR 137 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 HANDBOOK] ("The Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act, if adopted by the states, will serve to protect the interests of owners . . . ."); see
also Ray H. Garrison, Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35
KY. L.J. 302, 306 (1947) ("The objective sought in laws giving the state possession of
property presumed abandoned is primarily to conserve property for owners who have
become disassociated with possession and to protect it from risks attendant with long
neglect."). It should also be noted that in addition to the traditional justification behind
escheat law, the Act also sought to "end[] jurisdictional conflict" between claimants of
intangible property. See Kelly, supra note 24, at 1054-55; see also Clarold L. Britton,
Comment, Escheat-Abandoned Property-Full Faith and Credit as a Bar to Multiple
Escheat of Intangibles, 59 MICH. L. REv. 756, 779 (1961) (noting that the Act had two
purposes in mind, one of which was "the prevention of multiple escheat").
52 1954 HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at 137 (observing that the Act would serve to not
only protect a true owner's interest in the property, but also "make[] possible a substantial
simplification of procedure," and would "preclude multiple liability").
53 Id. (observing that the Act would serve "to relieve the holders from annoyance,
expense and liability").
54 R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., A STUDY OF ESCHEAT AND UNCLAIMED PROPERTY STATUTES
74 (1962) (quoting 1954 HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at 137) (indicating that the Act will
"give the adopting state the use of some considerable sums of money that otherwise would,
in effect, become a windfall to the holders thereof"). The fact that the original Act affords
the state the financial benefit of escheat of unclaimed property, however, cannot be viewed
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Specifically, the 1954 act attempted to harmonize the existing law by
establishing a uniform dormancy period of seven years for most types of
intangible property.55 The Act also codified the Supreme Court's decision in
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore,56 which based the ability to
make a claim for abandoned property upon whether or not the court had
personal jurisdiction over the debtor.57 Therefore, a state could make a claim for
abandoned property under one of two scenarios: if the holder's domicile was
within the state or if the holder's last known address was within the state and
the holder conducted its business there.58 By adopting the jurisdictional rule
from Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance, the Act attempted to "protect a holder
of intangible property from the dangers of multiple escheat."59
The impetus for two subsequent revisions to the 1954 Act was the need to
keep pace with developing Supreme Court case law.60 In an attempt to codify
the Court's decision in Texas v. New Jersey61 and to address the shortcomings
of the 1954 and 1966 versions of the Act, the NCCUSL drafted a major revision
in 1981.62 Prior to its enactment, more and more states were realizing the
revenue potential of their unclaimed property statutes; consequently, many
attempted to step up enforcement. 63 Their efforts were frustrated by a general
lack of compliance by holders of abandoned property.64 This trend was
attributable, in part, to confusion over the new dual-priority structure articulated
as a euphemism for revenue generation. See 1954 HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at 137. Indeed,
the closest that the commissioners came to acknowledging revenue generation as a
legitimate purpose of the legislation was in their general commentary on recent
developments in state unclaimed property law. See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT (1981),
Prefatory Note, 8C U.L.A. 153 (2003) (noting that states have increasingly been "using the
'windfall' unreturned funds as general fund receipts for the benefit of citizens of the state"
and consequently, have "sought to enforce their unclaimed property laws with enhanced
vigor").
55 1954 HANDBOOK, supra note 51, at 140 ("This period is used throughout the Uniform
Act and is applied to all types of property subject to the Act.").
56333 U.S. 541 (1948).
57 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 13, at 1440.
5 8 1d.
59 Britton, supra note 51, at 784.
6 0 See Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490 (1993); Pennsylvania v. New York, 407
U.S. 206 (1972); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965). Part III.A of this Note will
delve more deeply into the Supreme Court's dual-priority, interstate escheat framework as
articulated in Texas v. New Jersey, and subsequently reaffirmed in Pennsylvania v. New York
and Delaware v. New York. The purpose of introducing these cases within this section is
limited to contextualizing the NCCUSL's substantive revisions to its model unclaimed
property acts.
61379 U.S. 674 (1965). See infra Part III.A for a more detailed examination of the
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by the Court in Texas, as well as ineffective enforcement provisions within the
1954 and 1966 versions of the Act.65
In addition to codifying the Supreme Court's decision in Texas, the revision
made several other notable changes to the Act. Perhaps the most controversial
change was the Act's introduction of a third-priority rule, 66 which provided that
if either of the first two priority rules failed, 67 the state where the transaction
that gave rise to the intangible property occurred was entitled to escheat the
property. 68 Other notable changes within the 1981 Act included: encouraging
cooperation between states in the sharing of information, expanding the
definition of intangible property to include stock certificates, requiring holders
in possession of an owner's last known address to maintain this record for a
minimum of ten years, and reducing the dormancy period from seven to five
years before property could escheat to the state. 69
The 1995 revisions to the Unclaimed Property Act, while predominantly
motivated by the Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. New York,
65 d. at 153-54.
66 See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 3 (1981), 8C U.L.A. 189 (2003).67 See infra Part III.A for an extended discussion of the Supreme Court's dual-priority
escheat framework.68 UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 3 (1981), 8C U.L.A. 189 (2003). The relevant
language of the third-priority rule is as follows:
[I]ntangible property is subject to the custody of this State as unclaimed property if the
conditions raising a presumption of abandonment under Sections 2 and 5 through 16 are
satisfied and:
(6) the transaction out of which the property arose occurred in this State, and
(i)(A) the last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to
the property is unknown, or
(B) the last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to
the property is in a state that does not provide by law for the escheat or
custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed property law is not
applicable to the property, and
(ii) the holder is a domiciliary of a state that does not provide by law for the
escheat or custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed property law
is not applicable to the property.
Id. 69 UNIF UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT (1981), Prefatory Note, 8C U.L.A. 156-57 (2003). The
commissioners cited three main justifications for their decision to reduce dormancy periods
from seven to five years for most types of intangible property: an increase in mobility of the
population during the time between 1966 and 1981. Id. at 186. Second, the commissioners
explicated that an examination of those states with shorter dormancy periods demonstrated
that they were able to return a higher percentage of unclaimed property. Id. Finally, the high
inflation rates at the time, according to the commissioners, "exact[] a severe penalty from
one who holds money or its equivalent for extended periods; an inference of loss or
abandonment may be drawn more quickly than in 1966 when the value of money was more
stable." Id. at 157.
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introduced several important, albeit incremental, changes to the unclaimed
property landscape. 70 The Court's decision in Delaware reaffirmed the dual-
priority framework established by the Court in Texas and codified in the 1981
version of the Act, but it also clarified that the Court's priority rules could not
be superseded by state statutory law7 -a holding with substantial implications
for the emerging third-priority rule. 72 In addition to ensuring the continuing
validity of Texas, the commentary to section two of the Act introduced a
number of exceptions to the 1981 Act's general five-year presumption of
abandonment. 73 Some exceptions continued the developing trend of shortening
dormancy periods, 74 whereas others called upon the commissioners' experience
in justifying the continuation of longer dormancy periods.75
In the pursuit of increased uniformity among the several states, the model
unclaimed property acts promulgated by the NCCUSL have attempted to
accommodate the gradual liberalization in state escheat laws, while preserving
unclaimed property law's central purpose of reuniting an owner with her
abandoned property. Unclaimed property law has become increasingly "fiscally
significant"7 6 in the last several decades; however, neither the language nor
commentary from the original 1954 Act suggests that revenue generation was
within the contemplation of the NCCUSL. The section that follows presents the
most recent developments in unclaimed property law, arguing that the
aggressive techniques implemented by the majority of states during times of
budgetary crisis constitute a perversion of the historic purpose of and traditional
justification for unclaimed property law.
C. Recent Developments in State Enforcement of Unclaimed Property
Statutes: A Vehicle for Aggressive Revenue Generation
As the previous sections have foreshadowed, the recent focus of state
unclaimed property statutes has gravitated away from the efficient reunification
70 See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT (1995), Prefatory Note, 8C U.L.A. 87, 88 (2003).
71 Id
72 See infra Part III.B.
73 UNF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 2, Comment (1995), 8C U.L.A. 88, 104 (2003).
74 1d at 105 (referencing, for example, the one-year dormancy period for unclaimed
wages due to the unlikelihood of finding the owner of a payroll check beyond a year, as well
as the reduction in dormancy periods from five years to three for unpaid distributions from
retirement accounts).
75 d. ("For instance, statistical evidence indicates that a period of 15 years continues to
be appropriate in the case of travelers checks, and seven years in the case of personal money
orders and money orders issued by express companies."). The Act also provided some
additional measures to protect the true owners of unclaimed property, including revising the
definition of a "holder" in order to prioritize the obligation of paying the owner regardless of
whether or not that individual was the original debtor. REID, supra note 5, at 6. Additionally,
the Act called for civil penalties on noncompliant holders. Id.
76 Kelly, supra note 24, at 1048.
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of an owner with her abandoned property, and toward the generation of non-
controversial, tax-free revenue for the state. This section begins with two
methods states have implemented to enhance the revenue-making potential of
their unclaimed property statutes: reducing dormancy periods and expanding the
definition of what constitutes intangible property. This section concludes with
perhaps the most controversial development in state enforcement of unclaimed
property law: the aggressive use of contingent fee auditors to investigate
companies suspected of violating reporting requirements.
1. Reduced Statutory Dormancy Periods
One popular method that states have employed to enhance the revenue
potential of their unclaimed property statutes is shortening the length of
statutory dormancy periods.77 Generally defined as the period of time after
which a state takes custody of property presumed to be abandoned by its true
owner,78 dormancy periods-which at one time were as long as thirty years for
some types of property79-have undergone a drastic shortening in duration over
the last decade. 80 Perhaps unsurprisingly, these reductions have become
77 According to one well-reputed unclaimed property consulting firm, the number of
jurisdictions reporting a five-year dormancy period for unclaimed property within the
banking industry has decreased from thirty-six to thirty since 2003. Keane Unclaimed
Property Team, Dormancy Periods for Unclaimed Property Continue to Trend Downward,
KEANE INSIGHTS: UNCLAIMED PROP. ISSUES & NEWS (Feb. 1, 2012), http://unclaimed-
property.keaneco.com/dormancy-periods-for-unclaimed-property-continue-to-trend-
downward. By contrast, the number of jurisdictions reporting a three-year dormancy period
has increased from twelve to twenty-two during. the same period. Id. For unclaimed
intangible property within the securities industry, the trend was even more pronounced.
Since 2001, the jurisdictions operating under a five-year dormancy period decreased from
thirty-six to twenty, whereas the number of jurisdictions reporting a three-year dormancy
period increased from nine to twenty. Id.
78 Hollis L. Hyans & Amy F. Nogid, Honey, I Shrunk the Dormancy Periods!, ST. TAx
TODAY, Feb. 21, 2011, at 559, http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110222-
Dormancy-Periods.pdf.
79 See, e.g., Provident Inst. for Say. v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660, 661 (1911) ("In 1907 the
General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed an act providing that deposits
in savings banks which had remained inactive and unclaimed for thirty years .. . should be
paid to the treasurer and receiver general.").
80 See, e.g., Stephen G. Harris & Phyllis J. Shambaugh, Abbreviated Unclaimed
Property Dormancy Periods, 31 J. PAYMENT SYS. L. 52, 52 (2007), available at http://
www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/b50f787d-8cba-4b04-a291-da45d8d998f5/Presentation
/PublicationAttachment/82a3ec45-Of65-48ed-bl5d-e53666f8c302/-7159882.pdf ("One
method states use to speed up the unclaimed property windfall is to reduce dormancy
periods."); id at 54 ("The trend among states is to shorten dormancy periods.").
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increasingly common since 2008,8 as most states that teetered on the brink of
financial ruin became increasingly desperate for novel sources of revenue.82
Although of growing popularity, this practice is not without controversy.
When a state reduces the dormancy period for any type of unclaimed property,
it receives a one-time, tax-free windfall of unclaimed property obligations.83
The most obvious and oft-cited concern stemming from this practice is that the
property in question, which has been presumed abandoned by the legislature,
may not actually be abandoned by its true owner. This raises a host of
constitutional issues, not the least of which is due process. 84 Furthermore, the
81 Some states that have recently reduced their dormancy periods include New York,
S.B. 2811, 234th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (lowering dormancy periods from five years
to three years for money and securities held in escrow, amounts due on deposits held by
banks, and interest or other increments held by a banking institution in a bond or mortgage
transferred by it); Michigan, H.B. 6421, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2010) (reducing
general dormancy period from five years to three years, money orders from seven years to
three years, gift cards from five years to three years, and funds held or owing under any life
or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract that has matured or terminated from five
years to three years, among others); Indiana, H.B. 1083, 116th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2010) (reducing dormancy periods from five years to three years for various property
types including, for example, a demand, savings, or matured time deposit); New Jersey, N.J.
Assem. B. 3002, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2010) (reducing dormancy periods for
travelers checks from fifteen to three years, for money orders from seven to three years, and
creating a two-year presumption of abandonment for stored value cards); and Arizona,
S.B. 1003, 49th Leg., 4th Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009) (reducing dormancy periods from fifteen
to three years for travelers checks, from seven to three years for money orders, from three to
two years for stock or equity interests, and from five to three years for demand, savings, or
time deposits).
82 See, e.g., Nicholas Johnson et al., Tax Measures Help Balance State Budgets: A
Common and Reasonable Response to Shortfalls, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-13-09sfp.pdf (last updated July 9, 2009) ("Were states to rely on
spending cuts alone to close their gaps, it would require unprecedented reductions in such
essential public services as health care, education, and assistance for the elderly and
disabled.").
83 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, § 1.06[3][c].
84For an insightful commentary on the recent reductions in unclaimed property
dormancy periods, see Hyans & Nogid, supra note 78, at 561 ("[W]ith the short periods in
vogue ... there is scant basis to conclude that the property actually has been abandoned, and
escheat statutes may run afoul of constitutional protections to property owners and
holders."). These commentators have also argued that because "the fundamental underlying
purpose of the unclaimed property act is to reunite owners with their property, a legislature's
revenue-raising goal is inherently suspect and should be subject to heightened scrutiny." Id.
at 563.
While repeatedly holding that custodial escheat statutes are constitutional, the Supreme
Court has at least impliedly suggested that there is an interrelationship between the length of
the dormancy period and the constitutionality of this legislative presumption. See Andersen
Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 241 (1944) ("[I]t is within the constitutional power of
the state to protect the interests of depositors from the risks which attend long neglected
accounts, by taking them into custody when they have been inactive so long as to be
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practice prioritizes a state's need for revenue above the general property
interests of its constituents. To the extent states persist in shrinking their
dormancy periods, they continue to subvert the doctrine's intended purpose of
protecting a true owner's property interests.
2. Expanding the Definition of Unclaimed Property
In addition to shortening dormancy periods, states have pursued greater
revenue by expanding their unclaimed property statutes to include new types of
intangible property. Recently, state unclaimed property laws have subsumed
such intangible property as unidentified remittances, unapplied cash, security
deposits, refunds, credit memos, leases, royalty payments, write-offs to
miscellaneous income, unredeemed gift certificates, and the unredeemed
portions of stored-value cards.85 This section concentrates on two of the more
recent and controversial types of intangible property that states have targeted:
uninvoiced receivables and promotional incentives. 86
Uninvoiced receivables constitute "account balances [] generated when a
company received goods but either the company does not receive a
corresponding invoice that can be associated with those goods or the company
receives an invoice but the amount of goods actually received exceeds the
amount stated on the invoice." 87 These types of balances are controversial
because they do not represent fixed liabilities or "property" owed to the holder's
presumptively abandoned. . . ."); see also Provident Inst. for Say. in Bos. v. Malone, 221
U.S. 660, 664 (1911) ("[I]f the statute had provided that the money should be paid over to
the receiver-general if the owner, after a short absence, could not be found, or if the account
remained inactive for a brief period, a very different question would be presented. . . ."
(emphasis added)); Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 476-77 (1905) ("[T]he
creation by a state law of an arbitrary and unreasonable presumption of death resulting from
absencefor a brief period, would be a want of due process of law ..... (emphasis added)).
At least one district court has boldly held that a statute reducing the dormancy period
from fifteen years to seven years for travelers checks violates the Due Process Clause. See
Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hollenbach, 630 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764 (E.D. Ky.
2009), vacated sub nom. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685,
690 (6th Cir. 2011) ("Because it is clear that the state's objective was to raise revenue rather
than to reunite citizens with lost property, [the statute] does not satisfy rational basis review.
Shortening the presumptive abandonment period from fifteen to seven years is not
'rationally related' to raising revenue for the state .... ).
85 Robert Peters, Treasury Alliance Group Webinar Series-Unclaimed Property: The
Changing Landscape, DUFF & PHELPS (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.duffandphelps.com/
expertise/webcasts/pages/webcastDetail.aspx?itemid=42&list-Webcasts.
86 Ethan D. Millar & Kendall L. Houghton, Unclaimed Property: The Solution to State





vendors, 88 and they have become so commonplace in commercial transactions
that requiring a business to escheat these obligations invariably increases the
costs of doing business.89 Put simply, uninvoiced receivables are not the type of
obligations in need of protection by the state. As of 2009, only thirteen states
exempted business-to-business transactions90 from their unclaimed property
statutes.91
Promotional incentives are a second type of intangible property that state
unclaimed property statutes have subsumed. The most common type of
promotional incentive is uncashed rebate checks--commonly referred to as
"slippage"-the outstanding value of which has been estimated in the hundreds
of millions of dollars nationwide. 92 Because of the continuing popularity of
these incentives, there is incredible revenue to be realized by targeting
companies that issue these incentives.93
88 Id.
8 9 See JANA S. LESLIE, COUNCIL ON STATE TAXATION, THE BEST AND WORST OF STATE
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LAWS: SCORECARD ON STATE UNCLAIMED PROPERTY STATUTES: THE
HOLDER'S PERSPECTIVE 4 (Jan. 2009), www.cost.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=
71960.
90 Uninvoiced receivables, it should be noted, are a subset of the common business-to-
business exemption, which frequently encompasses accounts payable, accounts receivable,
or other types of inter-company credits. The general principle underlying the business-to-
business exemption is that the volume of business transactions between companies
frequently leads to accounting over- and under-payment-transactions that appear to
produce intangible property obligations, but in reality are merely inter-company credits and
debits that will be worked out in the future. See REID, supra note 5, at 74. Therefore, it
should not be within the realm of unclaimed property statutes to "clean up the financial
dealings of corporations and their business associates." Id.
9 11d. at 75. Notably, in July 2010, Delaware Governor Jack Markell was applauded for
signing Senate Bill 272 into law, which exempted uninvoiced payables from the state's
definition of unclaimed property. See, e.g., Michelle Andre, Delaware: Unclaimed Property
Legislation Is Enacted, KPMG TAX NEWS FLASH-UNITED STATES (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.us.kpmg.com/microsite/taxnewsflash/2010/Aug/1 0351 .pdf. Although this
change represented a significant update to Delaware's unclaimed property statute, it
certainly bucked the current trend of expanding the definition of unclaimed property to
include uninvoiced receivables. See, e.g., Millar & Houghton, supra note 86, at 727
("Although uninvoiced payables are no longer an issue in Delaware, other states have now
begun to assert that uninvoiced payables must be reported as unclaimed property.").
92 Brian Grow, The Great Rebate Runaround, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 22,
2005), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-11-22/the-great-rebate-runaround; Millar
& Houghton, supra note 86, at 727.
93 For example, in June 2012, Staples, Inc. agreed to pay $8.9 million to settle a dispute
with the state of Delaware stemming from a 2005 unclaimed property audit. Randall Chase,
Staples Pays $8.9M to Settle Dispute with Delaware, YAHOO! FIN. (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/staples-pays-8-9m-settle-192209466.html. The settlement
decision was driven, at least in part, by the Delaware Chancery Court's rejection of Staples'
contention that uncashed rebates are not unclaimed property under the Delaware statute. See
Staples, Inc. v. Cook, 35 A.3d 421, 426 (Del. Ch. 2012) (holding that a rebate check was
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In the uncashed rebate check arena, the state of Iowa has become a
battleground between states that seek remittance of these promotional incentive
obligations and the companies that initially issue the rebate checks. Ongoing
litigation, originally filed in 2006, carries substantial future implications for
companies that issue promotional incentives. 94 The Treasurer of the State of
Iowa, following an audit conducted by a third-party company,95 initiated suit
against Young America Corporation-one of the largest rebate fulfillment
companies-and several of its high-profile clients, including Walgreens, T-
Mobile, and Sprint.96 The suit was joined by forty-five other states which
collectively sought over $120 million in damages 97 from Young America and
its clients for failing to report and remit the proceeds of uncashed rebate checks,
in contravention of state unclaimed property laws.98 Defendants Walgreens, T-
Mobile, and Sprint sought dismissal of the suit on the grounds that because they
were not in possession of the unclaimed rebates, they could not be considered
"holders" under their states' unclaimed property statutes. 99 The Iowa district
court denied the motion, concluding that the "holder" of unclaimed property is
the company that bears the initial obligation, not the rebate fulfillment company
or other third party, even when this third party retains the unclaimed funds in
question.'00 Therefore, the failure of Young America Corporation or any other
rebate fulfillment company to report and remit the unclaimed property of which
unclaimed property subject to escheat because it is "a quintessential example of a bill of
exchange and thus a specifically enumerated item under the Escheat Statute").
94 See Lee A. Zoeller et al., Two Recent Court Decisions Add Burdens and Create
Uncertainties Regarding Compliance with Unclaimed Property Laws, REED SMITH (Jan. 12,
2009), http://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/cfl449fb-d757-4888-be93-3f20ff9252ad/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/218584b8-d6ba-4322-80d7-915b7afl 1c29/TwoRecent
Court DecisionsAddBurdensandCreateUncertainties.pdf (citing Order, Fitzgerald v.
Young Am. Corp., No. CV 6030 (Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk Cnty., Jan. 5, 2009)). The issues
within the case were: "[W]hether uncashed rebate checks are reportable under Iowa's
unclaimed property laws and, if so, who is the proper party to report them to the State
Treasurer." Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., State Treasurer
and Attorney General Settle with Sprint over Iowans' Uncashed Rebate Checks (Feb. 12,
2010), http://www.state.ia.us/govemment/ag/latest-news/releases/feb_201 0/Sprint rebate
checks.html.
95 For a more detailed discussion of third-party, contingent-fee audits, see infra Part
II.C.3.
96Robert Peters, Client Alert: Uncashed Rebate Checks Are Latest Controversy
Between the States and Corporate America, DUFF & PHELPS, http://www.duffandphelps.com
/expertise/publications/pages/ArticleDetail.aspx?itemid-25&list-Articles (last visited Mar.
10, 2012).
97 Id
9 8 Id. Judith Welcom, Unclaimed Property: A Panacea for State Budget Woes?, SIDLEY
AUSTIN: UNCLAIMED PROP. UPDATE (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.sidley.com/unclaimed
propertyupdate_042610/.
99 Peters, supra note 96.
10 0 Zoeller, supra note 94.
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it is in possession does not absolve the company issuing the initial obligation
from liability.' 0 '
Although the Young America case involves a specific interpretation of Iowa
law, it carries national implications as Iowa's unclaimed property statute is
similar or identical to most other states and the District of Columbia.102
Furthermore, the case evidences the willingness of state regulators to
collectively pressure holders of unclaimed property to report and remit new
categories of intangible property that have not been of interest in the past. 0 3
3. Aggressive Multi-state Use of Contingent-Fee Auditors
The final and perhaps most significant development in unclaimed property
law is the rise of multi-state audits and the use of contingent-fee auditors in the
collection of unreported intangible property obligations. These heavily revenue-
focused tactics simply cannot be reconciled with unclaimed property law's
original purpose of reuniting owner and abandoned intangible property. This
section begins with an overview of a company's duty to report and then presents
two controversial methods that contingent-fee auditors utilize to maximize
revenue for the state employing them: lengthy "look-back" periods and
estimation of liability that antedates a holder's business records.
a. The duty to report
Unclaimed property reporting is mandatory in all fifty states and the District
of Columbia.104 Prior to submitting an unclaimed property report, a company
must first complete its due diligence by attempting to locate the property's true
owner.105 If these attempts are unsuccessful and the statutory dormancy period
has lapsed for the type of property in question, the company holder must initiate
the reporting process and turn over the property to the proper jurisdiction.106
There are a number of steps a company must take in order to ensure compliance
with a state's reporting requirements, beginning with the basic questions of
what does it owe and to whom does it need to be paid? 0 7 In answering these
questions, a company must typically identify the type of intangible property that
it is holding, determine in which jurisdiction it has an obligation to report,
101 Id.
102 Peters, supra note 96.
103 Welcom, supra note 98. As of February 2010, Sprint agreed to a $22 million
settlement with Iowa and thirty-six additional states. See Press Release, Iowa Dep't of
Justice, supra note 94.104 REID, supra note 5, at 15.
105 Id. at 12.
10 6 d. ("If a holder cannot find the true owner, the states require that holder to remit the
property to the state for safekeeping.").
107Id. at 23.
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confirm if the respective state's statute provides an exemption for any of the
types of intangible property the company is holding, prepare and file the
unclaimed property report, and remit the funds to the appropriate reporting
agency. 108
Notwithstanding the informational and practical resources available to
companies, as well as a more general awareness of the heightened enforcement
of reporting requirements, only about ten to twenty percent of companies in the
United States fully comply with state unclaimed property requirements.109
Consequently, many major companies each year find themselves the subject of
a multi-state audit, the implications of which are discussed in greater detail
below.
b. Multi-State Audits, Contingent-Fee Auditors, and the Relentless
Pursuit ofRevenue
The rise of contingent-fee auditing represents perhaps the most significant
threat to holders of unclaimed property obligations and has been the conduit
through which states have brought these companies into compliance with the
law. As of 2009, more than forty states have employed third-party, contingent-
fee auditors to investigate companies believed to be noncompliant with state
reporting requirements."10 A contingent-fee auditor is typically a company on
retainer by an individual state that is compensated on a contingent-fee basis-
usually a percentage of the unclaimed property obligations that it uncovers
through its audit."'1 The average percentage rate of compensation for these
auditors is twelve percent of the unclaimed property obligations discovered."12
The contingent-fee nature of this arrangement provides auditors with a direct
incentive to resolve reporting disputes in favor of the states that employ theml 3
and to push the envelope in discovering "liabilities that go well beyond
traditional legal interpretations."ll 4
108 Id. at 16-22, 34.
109 Id. at 3 (as of 2008).
1 10 Robert S. Peters & Matthew J. Beintum, Going Fishing: State Budget Deficits Drive
an Expanding Net of Unclaimed Property Collections, J. MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES,
July 2009, at 26, 29.
111 Scott D. Smith, Loyalty Reward Programs Raise a Host of Questions Under State
Unclaimed Property Laws, HosPrrALIrAs NEWSL. (July 1, 2011), http://www.bakerdonelson.
com/loyalty-reward-programs-raise-a-host-of-questions-under-state-unclaimed-property-
laws-06-30-201 1/.
112 REID, supra note 5, at 46.
1l3 Millar & Houghton, supra note 86, at 723; see also REID, supra note 5, at 47
("Holders and consultants ... who have made a commitment to represent only holders feel
that there is an inherent conflict of interest in hiring a company that has a financial stake in
the outcome of an audit .... ).
1l4Peters & Beintum, supra note 110, at 29. Peters and Beintum reference the critics of
contingent-fee auditing who "contend that states have overextended the definition of what
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These audits typically begin with a single company's records within a
single state. With larger corporations, however, they can quickly expand to an
audit of a single company on behalf of as many as thirty to forty states
simultaneously.11 5 Multi-state audits create enormous financial incentives for
the auditors, who receive their fee for unclaimed property obligations
discovered on behalf of each state involved in the audit,"l 6 and present
substantial difficulties for companies in appealing the adverse determinations of
these auditors due to the complexities of such a massive audit.11 7 Furthermore,
in addition to seizing the property discovered during an audit, state unclaimed
property statutes frequently levy substantial penalties and interests against a
company found to be harboring unreported unclaimed property-amounts that
can far exceed the actual value of the property recovered. 18
One of the most significant issues that arises in any single- or multi-state
audit is that a corporate holder typically does not maintain records of its
intangible property obligations as far back as an individual state's "look-back"
period. Most states have a look-back period of ten years, which does not include
the applicable dormancy period-usually ranging from three to five years.119
This effectively ensures an audit period of thirteen to fifteen years120 -a time
constitutes 'unclaimed property' and have placed an undue burden on business to meet
compliance requirements." Id. at 29-30.
115Millar & Houghton, supra note 86, at 723.
l6 Marc Musyl et al., Unclaimed Property Audits: No Laughing Matter, CORP. & SEC.
CLIENT ADVISORY 2 (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.gtlaw.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/
contentpilot-core-401-18819/pdfCopy.name=/GTcaUnclaimed%2OProperty/o2OAudits_
Aug2011 .pdf?view=attachment.
117 Millar & Houghton, supra note 86, at 723.
Il8 Musyl et al., supra note 116, at 1.
119 Smith, supra note 111, at 2.
120d; see also Millar & Houghton, supra note 86, at 724. Delaware, by contrast, has
historically looked back as far as 1981 when it initiates an unclaimed property audit. Id.
Although legislation has been introduced to shorten the period that the state can look back
during an unclaimed property audit from 1981 to 1995, perhaps unsurprisingly, House Bill
229 has yet to emerge from Delaware's House Judiciary Committee. See Delaware
Unclaimed Property Proposed Legislative Amendments, MOODY, FAMIGLIETTI &
ANDRONICO ALERTS & INSIGHTS (Aug. 2011), http://www.mfa-cpa.com/alerts-and-
insights/alerts/201 1/delaware-unclaimed-property-proposed-legislative-amendments.
On July 11, 2012, Senate Bill 258 was signed into law, establishing a new voluntary
disclosure program to be administered by the Delaware Secretary of State. See Keane
Unclaimed Property Team, Delaware Passes SB 258: Establishes Voluntary Disclosure
Program, KEANE'S UNCLAIMED PROP. BLOG (July 23, 2012), http://unclaimed-
property.keaneco.com/delaware-voluntary-disclosure-program. Under this disclosure
program, companies indicating their intent to come forward and enter into a Voluntary
Disclosure Agreement (VDA) with the state of Delaware before June 30, 2014 will only be
required to report all outstanding unclaimed property obligations back to either 1996 or
1993, depending on how quickly the company manifests its intent to comply with the
program. Id Prior to Senate Bill 258, the state of Delaware offered reduced exposure to
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period that substantially exceeds the average seven-year period that a company
maintains its records.121 The effect of these extensive look-back periods is an
added financial burden upon companies to keep their business records for nearly
double the length of time they would otherwise choose to maintain this
information. Furthermore, the lengthy period almost certainly ensures that an
auditor will be authorized to perform an estimation for the years that antedate a
company's records. 122 It is a controversial practice and a subject to which this
section now turns.
Suppose that a state's look-back period is ten years. Suppose further that a
company within that state's jurisdiction is the unfortunate subject of an
unclaimed property audit. Upon investigating the company's records-which,
pursuant to company policy, are only maintained for a period of five years-the
state's auditors discover substantial intangible property obligations, which (1)
became abandoned after a dormancy period of three years, and (2) were never
reported or remitted to the state. The operative question, and source of the
underlying controversy, is how would these auditors determine the intangible
property obligations from year six (the first year after the expiration of the
company's business records) through year thirteen (the ten-year look-back
period plus three-year dormancy period)?
The answer to the question posed above is that the liabilities for years six
through thirteen would be determined using estimation and extrapolation. 123
Typically, the state will calculate the corporate holder's actual unclaimed
property liability for the years for which it has accurate records, take the amount
of the liability and divide it by the holder's total revenue over the same period,
and then apply this "error rate" to the years for which the holder no longer
maintained adequate business records.124 This process has been met with
substantial criticism for two predominant reasons: first, because the period used
to estimate a holder's obligation represents a small and potentially misleading
sample of a company's actual unclaimed property obligations, extrapolating
across a greater time period may not accurately reflect a corporate holder's
actual financial obligation. 125 Second, and more relevant to this Note, is that
companies that agreed to voluntarily disclose their outstanding unclaimed property liability
by restricting the look-back period to 1991-as opposed to 1981 for companies that did not
avail themselves of the program. Id. While a step in the right direction, Delaware's reforms
are indeed a very small step. A company selected for an audit by the state of Delaware-as
opposed to one that voluntarily complies with Delaware's new disclosure program-is still
required to report unclaimed property obligations back to 1981 under the state's traditional
rules. See id. Furthermore, a company that avails itself of Delaware's disclosure program is
still subject to liability for a bare minimum of sixteen years-substantially longer than the
more common ten-year period in most other states. Smith, supra note 111, at 2.
121 Millar & Houghton, supra note 86, at 724.
122 Id
123 Peters & Beintum, supra note 110, at 33.
124 Millar & Houghton, supra note 86, at 723-24.
125 Peters & Beintum, supra note 110, at 33.
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this "estimated" unclaimed property is de facto revenue for the state to which it
escheats, as there are no actual owners who could conceivably step forward in
the future to claim the abandoned property.126 Furthermore, because the revenue
is derived from estimation rather than from business records containing actual
owners with discernible last known addresses, the state of the holder's corporate
domicile will take the entirety of these estimated unclaimed property
obligations under the Supreme Court's secondary priority rule.127 In the case of
most major American corporate entities, the state of corporate domicile
receiving the majority of this financial windfall is Delaware.
D. Conclusion
Unclaimed property law, originally conceived as a means of facilitating the
reunification of a true owner and her abandoned property, has become an
incredibly efficient vehicle for generating tax-free revenue during a time of
budgetary crises. More recent developments-including shortening dormancy
periods, expanding definitions of unclaimed property, and aggressively utilizing
contingent-fee auditors-have led to revenue generation that was never
contemplated by the NCCUSL when it promulgated the original Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act in 1954. Yet, for all of the fiscal
benefits conferred on the states, these advances have also subverted unclaimed
property law's purpose of ensuring that citizens have a central repository where
their misplaced property would be safely held until reclaimed.
The previous section focused on developments in state law governing
unclaimed property indisputably within its jurisdiction. The section that follows
turns to the Supreme Court's current interstate escheat framework, which
governs the situation where multiple states make concomitant claims to the
same intangible property. The current framework, when combined with the
multitude of revenue-based developments at the state level, has led the state of
Delaware-as the state in which most American companies incorporate-to
inequitably reap exorbitant financial benefits.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DUAL-PRIORITY FRAMEWORK AND THE
CONTROVERSIAL EMERGENCE OF THE "THIRD-PRIORITY" RULE
Part II of this Note-in the interest of introducing the concept of custodial
escheat in its simplest form-presupposes that the state to which unclaimed
126 See id. at 29, 33; Millar & Houghton, supra note 86, at 724.
127 Peters & Beintum, supra note 110, at 29; Millar & Houghton, supra note 86, at 724
("As the state of domicile of the largest percentage of incorporated and unincorporated
business entities, Delaware is the state that most often benefits from these estimations."). For
a more detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's interstate escheat rules, see infra Part
IIl.A.
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intangible property has escheated is the sole potential recipient of the benefit of
this property. Because intangible property is not physical property that can be
pinpointed to a specific location,128 often a single state cannot claim the sole
right to escheat the property in question.129 This unique characteristic-when
combined with the Supreme Court's holding in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey
that more than one state cannot escheat the same abandoned property 30- has
led to competition among multiple states to gain the right to escheat the same
intangible property.
In 1965, the Supreme Court-acting as a court of original jurisdictionl 31-
attempted to create a uniform and easily administrable solution 32 to these
conflicts by crafting a dual-priority, interstate escheat framework that governed
which state could take custody of abandoned intangible property when multiple
states made legally cognizable claims.133 This framework has remained binding
precedent for forty-eight years; however, in the last quarter century,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's admonitions in Texas v. New Jersey and
subsequently in Delaware v. New York,134 a majority of states have carved out
an exception to the dual priority framework'35 : a so-called "third-priority" rule,
which empowers the state where the transaction that gave rise to the intangible
property occurred to take custody if both the primary or secondary priority rules
fail.136 These statutes-especially deemed owner address provisions 37-are of
128 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
129 See Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1993) ("No serious controversy
can arise between States seeking to escheat 'tangible property, real or personal' . . . . On the
other hand, intangible property 'is not physical matter which can be located on a map,' and
frequently no single State can claim an uncontested right to escheat such property." (internal
citations omitted)).
130 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
131 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction.").
132 See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 683 (1965) ("[T]he issue here is not
controlled by statutory or constitutional provisions or by past decisions, nor is it entirely one
of logic. It is fundamentally a question of ease of administration and of equity.").
133Id. at 677.
134Delaware, 507 U.S. at 500 ("[A]nd no State may supersede [these priority rules] by
purporting to prescribe a different priority under state law.").
135 Ethan D. Millar & John L. Coalson, Jr., Some States Escheating Unredeemed Gift
Cards Ignore Federal Laws, 56 ST. TAX NOTES 381, 381 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1612205.
136Id at 381 n.2.
137Id at 381 ("That provision ... generally states that if the holder of an unredeemed
gift card does not have a record of the card owner's last known address and the card was
sold in that state, that address is presumed to be the address of the state treasurer or other
state official."). For a thoughtful argument that stored value cards should be exempted from
state escheat laws, see generally Sean M. Diamond, Note, Unwrapping Escheat: Unclaimed
Property Laws and Gift Cards, 60 EMORY L.J. 971 (2011).
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considerable utility to states facing budget crises and represent a more equitable
method of appropriating unclaimed property receipts; yet, they raise difficult
questions about their constitutional validity.
Section A begins by introducing and contextualizing the current dual-
priority escheat framework articulated in Texas v. New Jersey. Section B
provides a brief introduction of the third-priority rule and its precipitous
emergence within the abandoned property landscape. Finally, section C takes a
critical look at the arguments for and against the constitutionality of this rule,
ultimately concluding that the third-priority rule, in its traditional form, is
preempted by Supreme Court case law. Consequently, because the states are
unable to circumvent the Court's framework, any attempts to rework the current
dual-priority structure must come from Congress.
A. Texas v. New Jersey: The Birth ofInterstate Escheat Priority Rules
This section introduces the current dual-priority escheat framework as
articulated by the Supreme Court in its 1965 opinion in Texas v. New Jersey.138
Although the 1954 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act endeavored
to end conflicts between states asserting concomitant claims to the same
intangible property,139 by 1961 the Act had only been adopted in twelve
states140 and was largely ineffectual at ending the rash of interstate litigation
over the rights to unclaimed intangible property.141 Four years later, the
Supreme Court concluded that the time had come for a bright-line set of priority
rulesl 42 in order to bring stability to an unsettled area of the law.
In Texas v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court considered an action for an
injunction and a declaration of rights brought by the state of Texas against New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Sun Oil Company.143 The action was brought for
the purpose of settling a controversy over which of these three states was legally
entitled to take custody of various small debts totaling $26,461.65 that Sun Oil
Company owed to 1,730 creditors who had not come forward to claim their
138 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
139 See supra Part II.B.
140 See 1954 HANDBOOK, supra note 51 (noting that by 1961, the 1954 Act had been
adopted in Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia); see also Kelly, supra note 24, at 1055.
141 Kelly, supra note 24, at 1054-55.
142 See Texas, 379 U.S. at 677 ("Since the States separately are without constitutional
power to provide a rule to settle this interstate controversy and since there is no applicable
federal statute, it becomes our responsibility. . . to adopt a rule which will settle the question
of which State will be allowed to escheat this intangible property."); see also Kelly, supra
note 24, at 1056.
143 Texas, 379 U.S. at 675. The state of Florida was also permitted to intervene because
it claimed the right to escheat the portion of the proceeds that was attributable to parties
whose last known address was within Florida. Id. at 677.
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property for periods of time ranging from seven to forty years.144 Texas asserted
its right to the proceeds because the debts were either found on the books of Sun
Oil's two Texas offices or concerned individuals whose last known addresses
were in the state of Texas.145 New Jersey claimed the right to escheat because
Sun Oil was incorporated therein.146 Pennsylvania argued that because Sun
Oil's principal place of business was located within its borders, it should receive
the benefit of custodial escheat.147 Sun Oil, although not making any claims to
the proceeds in question, was a party to the lawsuit in order to ensure that it
would not be subject to multiple liability.148 From each of these differing
perspectives emerged four proposed rules' 49 regarding which state should be
given exclusive jurisdiction of intangible property in an interstate escheat
dispute: the state with the most significant contacts, 150 the state of the corporate
holder's domicile or incorporation,151 the state where the corporate holder's
144Id. at 675.
145 Id. at 675-76.
146Id. at 676.
I47 Id.
148 Texas, 379 U.S. at 676.
149 Of the four proposed rules above, the Supreme Court dismissed the first three. Id at
678-79. In rejecting Texas' argument that the minimum contacts test should determine the
state to which the intangible property escheats, the Court was concerned that structuring a
framework around such a nebulous test would result in "difficult, often quite subjective,
decisions as to which State's claim to those pennies or dollars seems stronger than
another's." Id. at 679. Next, the Court faulted New Jersey's proposed rule that the state of
corporate domicile should control because "it would too greatly exalt a minor factor to
permit escheat of obligations incurred all over the country by the State in which the debtor
happened to incorporate itself." Id. at 679-80. Finally, the Court found Pennsylvania's
proposal that the principal place of business should control appealing, but ultimately
concluded that each case "would raise. . . the sometimes difficult question of where a
company's 'main office' or 'principal place of business' or whatever it might be designated
is located." Id. at 680. Similar to its concerns with Texas' proposed rule, the Court feared
that Pennsylvania's rule would lead to a propensity to engage in a case-by-case analysis of
the particular facts of a dispute, as opposed to encouraging the uniform enforcement of a
bright-line rule. Id.
150Id. at 678. For the Supreme Court's articulation of its minimum contacts standard,
see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[D]ue process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that . .. the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."').
151 Texas, 379 U.S. at 679.
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principal place of business is located,152 or the state of the creditor's last known
address as shown by the corporate holder's books and records. 53
Rejecting the Texas, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania proposals, the Supreme
Court held "that each item of property in question in this case is subject to
escheat only by the State of the last known address of the creditor, as shown by
the debtor's books and records." 54 Underlying the Court's decision was the
principle that the property ultimately belonged to the creditor, and therefore it
should be subject to escheat by the state of the creditor's residence.155
This first priority rule, however, did not address which state had the right to
escheat the intangible property when an owner's last address was not found
within a holder's books and records or when an owner's last known address was
within a state that did not provide for escheat of the type of intangible property
in question.156 In either situation, the Court held that the intangible property
would escheat to the state of the corporate debtor's domicile. 157 The state of the
debtor's incorporation, however, could be divested of the property if another
state came forward with "proof that the last known address of the creditor was
within its borders."' 58 Similarly, where the state of the owner's last known
address did not provide for escheat of the property in question, escheat to the
state of the corporate domicile was "subject to the right of the State of the last
known address to recover it if and when its law made provision for escheat of
such property." 59
To help illustrate the interplay between these priority rules, consider the
following example.160 Company Y, which is incorporated in the state of
Delaware, has a retail center in Trenton, New Jersey. Employee Z, who works
in this retail center, resides fourteen miles away in Newtown, Pennsylvania.
Assume further that Employee Z has recently quit Company Y and has
requested that his final paycheck be forwarded to his home address. In the
meantime, Employee Z, without notifying Company Y of his new address,
moves from Newtown; thereafter, the post office returns his final paycheck to
Company Y. If Employee Z is not successfully notified or does not come
1521d. at 680. For the Supreme Court's articulation of its current principal place of
business standard, see Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010) ("We conclude
that 'principal place of business' is best read as referring to the place where a corporation's
officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities. It is the place that Courts
of Appeals have called the corporation's 'nerve center."').
153 Texas, 379 U.S. at 680-81.
154Id. at 681-82.
155 McThenia & Epstein, supra note 13, at 1443.




160 This illustrative example is adapted from a similar one found within RED, supra note
5, at 18.
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forward before the lapse of the statutory dormancy period, Company Y must
report this obligation. But to which jurisdiction is Company Y obligated to
report?
Company Y, under the Supreme Court's escheat rules, must report the
unclaimed property to Pennsylvania, the state of Employee Z's last known
address. Assume, however, that during the time between Employee Z leaving
the company and Company Y reporting his unclaimed payroll check (a period of
several years), Company Y has converted its aging payroll systems and the last
known address of Employee Z-who has now been an ex-employee for several
years-has been lost. Under this scenario, the state of Delaware, in which
Company Y is incorporated, would receive the funds from Employee Z's final
payroll check. New Jersey-where the working relationship between Company
Y and Employee Z was formed and where Employee Z worked for years-
would be deprived of any benefit of this intangible property.
Fundamentally underpinning the Court's decision in Texas-which one
commentator has described as "beguiling in its simplicity and
definitiveness"l 61-are the principles of ease of administration 62 and of
equity.163 As the majority announces toward the end of its opinion, it is not the
specifics of the Court's rules that drive its holding,164 but rather its desire to
settle the turbulent case law through an administratively simple and
fundamentally fair framework. Before turning to Part IV, which argues that it is
ultimately these principles to which a new regime must aspire, it is important to
introduce and examine the most common, and perhaps audacious, attempt by
states to sidestep the Court's decision in Texas: the third-priority rule.
161 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, § 2.04[2]; McThenia & Epstein, supra note 13, at
1444.
162 The Court makes repeated references to adopting a rule that is administratively
simple, avoids case-by-case analysis of unique fact patterns, and settles the state of the law.
Texas, 379 U.S. at 681 ("Adoption of such a rule involves a factual issue simple and easy to
resolve, and leaves no legal issue to be decided.. . . And by using a standard of last known
address, rather than technical legal concepts of residence and domicile, administration and
application of escheat laws should be simplified.").
163 The decision prioritized fairness and equity by denying a financial windfall to both
the corporate holder, see McThenia & Epstein, supra note 13, at 1444, and the state of
corporate domicile, Texas, 379 U.S. at 680 ("[Ut seems to us that in deciding a question
which should be determined primarily on principles of fairness, it would too greatly exalt a
minor factor to permit escheat of obligations incurred all over the country by the State in
which the debtor happened to incorporate itself.").
164 Texas, 379 U.S. at 683 ("We realize that this case could have been resolved
otherwise, for the issue here is not controlled by statutory or constitutional provisions or by
past decisions, nor is it entirely one of logic.").
542 [Vol. 74:3
INEQUITABLE ESCHEA T?
B. An Exception to the Dual-Priority Structure? The Emergence of the
Third-Priority Rule
In the last several decades, a majority of U.S. jurisdictions have carved out
exceptions to the U.S. Supreme Court's bright-line, dual-priority structure. 165
The most common of these attempts is the location-based "third-priority
rule,"166 which has been adopted by thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia.167 This rule specifies that if the primary and secondary priority rules
fail, "[T]he state in which the transaction giving rise to the unclaimed property
occurred has the right to claim the property."1 68 Although never successfully
challenged at the Supreme Court level, the third-priority rule's constitutionality
has been questioned since its adoption because of its apparent conflict with the
Court's well-established dual-priority scheme.169 Nevertheless, the jurisdictions
that have adopted this rule have done so under the assumption that the Court's
decision in Texas does not limit their power to escheat unclaimed intangible
property in the event that the primary or secondary priority rules are
inapplicable.170
165 Millar & Coalson, supra note 135, at 381.
166 See id. at 381 n.2.
167 See Marshall T. Kline & Kellie A. Lanford, Unclaimed Property: Getting Your
Priorities Straight, SALT TO TASTE: ST. & LOCAL TAX ITEMS OF INTEREST (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.stratatomic.com/uploads/dlptax/newsevents/UnclaimedProperty
GettingYourPrioritiesStraight.pdf; see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:30B-10 (West 2003)
("The transaction out of which the property arose occurred in this State, and (1) [t]he last
known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property is unknown, or
(2) [t]he last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property is
in a state that does not provide by law for the escheat or custodial taking of the property or
its escheat or unclaimed property law is not applicable to the property, and (3) [t]he holder is
a domiciliary of a state that does not provide by law for the escheat or custodial taking of the
property or its escheat or unclaimed property law is not applicable to the property.").
168 Millar & Coalson, supra note 135, at 381 n.2; see also UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT
§3 (1981), 8C U.L.A. 189 (2003).
169 See, e.g., Kline & Lanford, supra note 167. For a more detailed discussion of the
constitutionality of the third-priority rule, see infra Part III.C.
170 See Noel E. Hall, Jr., Matthew B. Chenowth, & Garth V. Jensen, Exemptions in
Unclaimed Property: Fact or Fiction?, TAX ADVISER (July 2001), at 466. Another possible
explanation is that because the 1981 and 1995 Uniform Acts introduced this location-based
rule, any state that has adopted these model statutes in their entirety has also effectively
adopted the third-priority rule, whether or not that state intended to carve out such an
exception to the Texas framework. Id. Still, others have impliedly suggested that some states
enforce their third-priority rule as a weapon against unsuspecting holders who are either
"ignorant to the Supreme Court's priority rules or who do not have the financial wherewithal
to challenge the state's claim." Jamie Ryan & Jameel Turner, Gift Certificate/Gifit Card
Legislation Update, CLIENT ALERT 2 (Sept. 2010), http://www.baileycavalieri.com/97-
ClientAlert.pdf.
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Recently, a handful of states have taken a more unorthodox approach to the
traditional third-priority rule.17' These so-called "deemed owner address
provisions" or "place-of-purchase" presumptions, which have been applied
almost exclusively to stored-valued cards, generally provide that-in the event
that the original holder's last known address is not maintained by the corporate
debtor-the address of the holder shall be presumed to be the Treasurer's office
of the state in which the transaction took place.172 In this way, the statute
functionally replaces the secondary priority rule-which would provide for
escheat to the state of the corporate debtor's domicile in the event that the last
known address of the true owner was not maintained-with a rule prioritizing
the location of the transaction that gave rise to the creditor-debtor
relationship.17 3 It is the constitutionality of the third-priority rule to which this
Note turns in the section that follows.
C. Critically Assessing the Constitutionality of the Third-Priority Rule
This section identifies and weighs the arguments for and against the
constitutionality of the traditional third-priority rule-a question that, until very
171 States that have experimented with deemed owner address provisions include Maine,
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 1958(2)(B-1) (Supp. 2011) ("The address of the owner of the gift
obligation or stored value card is . . . presumed to be that of the address of the Treasurer of
State unless the person who sells or issues the gift obligation or stored-value card obtains
and maintains the address of the owner"); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 120A.520(2) (2011)
("If a gift certificate is issued or sold in this State and the seller or issuer does not obtain and
maintain in his records the name and address of the owner of the gift certificate, the address
of the owner of the gift certificate shall be deemed to be the address of the Office of the
State Treasurer in Carson City."); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:30B-42.1 (West Supp.
2012), repealed by L.2012, ch. 14, § 1 eff. June 29, 2012 ("If the issuer of a stored value
card does not have the name and address of the purchaser or owner of the stored value
card ... the address of the place where the stored value card was purchased ... shall be
reported to New Jersey . .. if the . .. card was sold or issued . .. in New Jersey."); Texas,
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 72.1016(c) (West 2011) ("If the person who sells or issues a stored
value card in this state does not . .. maintain a record of the owner's name and address and
the identification number of the card, the address of the apparent owner is considered to be
the Austin, Texas, address of the comptroller."). Following the Third Circuit's decision in
New Jersey Retail Merchants Ass' v. Sidamon-Eristoff 669 F.3d 374, 400 (3d Cir. 2012),
§ 46:30B-42.1 of New Jersey's annotated statutes was amended to redact the state's place-
of-purchase presumption. See infra note 174.
172 See Millar & Coalson, supra note 135, at 381-82.
173 Of the handful of states that have adopted these provisions, Maine has perhaps the
most aggressive statute, which ostensibly does not distinguish between stored-value cards
purchased within its borders and those purchased elsewhere: under either scenario, the
state's presumption is that they were purchased in Maine and are therefore subject to escheat
therein. See Klein & Lanford, supra note 167. By contrast, Texas's statute specifies that the
stored value card must actually be purchased within the state if the address is to be presumed
to be that of the State Comptroller. Compare 33 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 1958(2)(B-1), with
TEX. PROP. CODE § 72.1016(c).
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recently, was rarely considered and only at the state and federal district court
level.174 This section concludes by arguing that the traditional third-priority rule
is preempted by the Court's decision in Texas. The implications of the rule's
unconstitutionality are significant: any attempts by states to alter the current
interstate escheat framework to more equitably distribute unclaimed property
proceeds are effectively foreclosed by Supreme Court case law. Therefore, any
hope of bringing an antiquated and inequitable system back in line with the core
principles of the Texas decision rests with Congress.
1. The Third-Priority Rule Is Preempted by the Supreme Court's Holding
in Texas
Challenges to the constitutionality of the third-priority rule have centered on
the doctrine of preemption. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, federal law is the supreme law of the land and therefore, cannot be
superseded by state statutory law.175 Although the federal law underlying the
current escheat framework is judge made and therefore, does not emanate from
Congress under its constitutionally delegated powers, this distinction is largely
irrelevant: "Federal common law is federal law as much as if it had been
enacted by Congress." 176 Thus, when state statutory law comes into conflict
with "federal common law set out in a decision based upon the Supreme Court's
174 See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Srvs. Co. v. Hollenbach, 630 F. Supp. 2d 757
(E.D. Ky. 2009); Am. Petrofina Co. v. Nance, 697 F. Supp. 1183 (W.D. Okla. 1986), aff'd,
859 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1988); State v. Chubb, 570 A.2d 1313 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1989); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 829 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1992). For a very
recent decision analyzing the constitutionality of the third-priority rule's cousin, the deemed
owner address provision, see New Jersey Retail Merchants Ass'n v. Sidamon-Eristoff 669
F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2012). In Sidamon-Eristoff, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court
for the District of New Jersey's conclusion that "Chapter 25['s] creation of a place-of-
purchase presumption when the last known address or zip code of a stored value card
purchaser/owner is unknown is preempted by the federal common law set forth in the Texas
line of cases," Am. Express Travel Related Srvs. Co. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d
556, 609 (D.N.J. 2010), providing the most thorough analysis of the constitutionality of the
third-priority rule and deemed owner address provisions to date. Sidamon-Eristoff 669 F.3d
at 396.
175 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
176 Am. Petrofina, 697 F. Supp. at 1187; see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91, 105 n.6 (1972) ("[W]here there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform
rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism, we have
fashioned federal common law."); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S.
310, 314 (1955) ("[S]ince in the absence of controlling Acts of Congress this Court has
fashioned a large part of the existing rules that govern admiralty. And States can no more
override such judicial rules validly fashioned than they can override Acts of Congress.").
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original jurisdiction and rendered for the purpose of national uniformity,"l 77 the
state law is thereby preempted.
The Supreme Court in Texas, acting as a court of original jurisdiction,
fashioned the dual-priority scheme governing interstate escheat of unclaimed
property absent a guiding federal statute or relevant constitutional provision.178
That decision-intended to settle the turbulent case law that had enveloped
conflicting interstate claims to the same intangible property-very clearly
established both a primary and secondary priority rule.179 In no part of the
opinion did the Court address a scenario where both the primary and secondary
rules failed,180 nor did it reference a location-based, third-priority rule. 181 To the
extent that a state statute creates a third-priority rule absent a decisional holding
from the Supreme Court, it has contravened the Court's mandate in Texas,182
and the law is therefore preempted.
Further support for the argument that state attempts to circumvent the
Court's dual-priority framework are preempted can be found in the Texas
Court's consideration and rejection of two proposals similar in nature to the
third-priority rule.183 The first was the state of Texas's proposal that the state
with the most significant contacts should be permitted the right to escheat the
property.184 Although relying upon numerous decisions by the Court, Texas's
proposal was summarily rejected because a "'contacts' test as applied in this
field is not really any workable test at all."185 Although not identical, a location-
based, third-priority rule has many overlapping characteristics with the
177 Am. Petrofina, 697 F. Supp. at 1187.
178 See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 683 (1965) ("We realize that this case could
have been resolved otherwise, for the issue here is not controlled by statutory or
constitutional provisions or by past decisions, nor is it entirely one of logic.").
179 See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
180 See Am. Express Travel Related Srys. Co. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d 556,
604-05 (D.N.J. 2010) ("Texas does not explicitly address what happens when the debtor's
State of incorporation does not escheat the particular intangible property at issue. Texas
merely held that the debtor's State of incorporation had 'the right to escheat."').
181 See Sidamon-Eristoff 755 F. Supp. 2d at 606-07 ("[IWn fashioning the Texas rules,
the Supreme Court expressly stated that the secondary rule applied when the law of the
primary rule state 'do[es] not provide for escheat.' That it made no similar concession in
connection with the secondary rule further suggests that no third priority was
envisioned. . . .").
182 Texas, 379 U.S. at 677 ("[I]t becomes our responsibility in the exercise of our
original jurisdiction to adopt a rule which will settle the question of which State will be
allowed to escheat this intangible property.").
183 Am. Petrofina Co. v. Nance, 697 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (W.D. Okla. 1986), aff'd, 859
F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that the 1981 Act conflicts with the Texas scheme because
"[it] utilizes a scheme, for custodial taking of unclaimed property, that was considered and
rejected by the Supreme Court.").
184 Texas, 379 U.S. at 679; see also supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
185 Texas, 379 U.S. at 679.
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contacts-based test rejected by the Court in Texas. 186 The second proposal was
from the state of Pennsylvania and would have rendered a corporate holder's
principal place of business as the primary priority rule because "[s]imilar
uncertainties would result if we were to attempt in each case to determine the
State in which the debt was created and allow it to escheat."l 87 Both proposals
closely approximate the third-priority rule, and the fact that both were
summarily rejected by the Texas Court adds further weight to the argument that
the Court did not envision a location-based, third-priority rule.
Finally, seven years after Texas was decided, the Supreme Court rejected
another attempt by the state of Pennsylvania to elevate the priority of the
location of the transaction that gave rise to the unclaimed property in question
in Pennsylvania v. New York.188 In that case, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania escheat statute that permitted the state to
escheat unclaimed money orders that were purchased from Western Union's
Pennsylvania offices.189 Pennsylvania encouraged the Court to discard its
secondary priority rule and adopt a presumption that the owners of the
unredeemed money orders were located in the state where the instrument was
purchased.190 The Court, in refusing to supplant the current framework,
reaffirmed its holding in Texas and echoed its desire to avoid "decid[ing] each
escheat case on the basis of its particular facts or to devise new rules of law to
apply to ever-developing new categories of facts."'91 Therefore, because the
Court rejected a location-based priority rule that closely resembled the current
third-priority rule, expanding the Court's holding in Texas to accommodate a
third-priority rule would run afoul of the Court's intention in Pennsylvania.
2. The Third-Priority Rule Does Not Directly "Conflict with" Texas and
Is Therefore Not Preempted
Although the vast majority of commentators would most likely conclude
that the traditional third-priority rule is, at best, of questionable validity and, at
worst, patently unconstitutional, there is an argument to be made that the third-
priority rule does not directly contravene federal common law. That argument
has two components.
On the one hand, a proponent of the constitutionality of the third-priority
rule would first distinguish between state statutory law that conflicts with
186 See Hall et al., supra note 170 ("[J]urisdictions that have a third priority rule have
effectively adopted a contacts test in contravention of Texas v. New Jersey. Ascertaining the
location of a transaction that produced a given item of intangible property will, in many
instances, involve factual vagaries similar to those produced by the contacts test . . .
187 Texas, 379 U.S. at 680.
188 407 U.S. 206 (1972).
189Id. at 209.
190Id at 212.
19 1 Id. at 215 (quoting Texas, 379 U.S. at 679).
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Supreme Court case law and state law that might expand upon a void in existing
Court precedent. 192 Because the traditional third-priority rule does not directly
contravene either the primary or secondary priority rules-addressing only a
scenario where both priority rules fail-it does not run afoul of the Court's
decision in Texas.193
The second, and perhaps better, justification highlights the fundamental
difference between Texas and a situation where a state acts as custodian of
unclaimed property escheated through its third-priority rule. More specifically,
in Texas there were other states-namely Texas, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Florida-asserting concomitant and conflicting claims to the same property.194
This situation is distinguishable from one in which a third-priority state asserts
the sole claim to an intangible property obligation: "Texas does not explicitly
address what happens when the debtor's state of incorporation does not escheat
the particular intangible property at issue . . .. [It] merely held that the debtor's
State of incorporation had 'the right to escheat."'l 95 Therefore, in a situation
where no state steps forward to claim the right to escheat an unclaimed property
obligation under either the primary or secondary priority rule,196 the third-
priority rule would empower the state where the transaction originally occurred
to "temporarily hold[] the property until the creditor's address becomes
apparent and the creditor's state asserts its superior right to escheat."l 97 In other
words, absent conflicting claims by more than one state, a third-priority rule
might coexist constitutionally with the Court's Texas decision.
192 See Am. Petrofina Co. v. Nance, 697 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (W.D. Okla. 1986), aff'd,
859 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1988) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. New Jersey, may
be relied upon to prevent state officials from enforcing a state law in conflict with the
Texas . .. scheme. . . ." (emphasis added)).
19 3 But see Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 500 (1993) ("These rules arise from
our 'authority and duty to determine for [ourselves] all questions that pertain' to a
controversy between States and no State may supersede them by purporting to prescribe a
different priority under state law." (citations omitted)).
194 See Kline & Lanford, supra note 167, at 2, 4 n.4.
195 Am. Express Travel Related Srvs. Co. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d 556,
604-05 (D.N.J. 2010).
196See id. at 605 ("Indeed, state courts have held that Texas applies only when two
states affirmatively seek to escheat the same property."); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Okla.
Corp. Comm'n, 829 P.2d 964, 971 (Okla. 1992) ("Nothing in Texas prohibits a state from
claiming temporary custody of unclaimed property until some other state comes forward
with proof that it has a superior right to it."); O'Connor v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 379
A.2d 1378, 1381 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) ("[T]he [Texas] Court meant its rule to be binding
only where there were multiple claims to the same property. . . because it believed either
one of those states would be willing and able to escheat.").




Attempts by the majority of states to carve out a third-priority rule from the
Supreme Court's escheat framework in Texas cannot be reconciled with
established Supreme Court case law. This argument is even more compelling
given the Court's rejection of similar proposals in Texas and its rejection of
Pennsylvania's attempt to elevate the location of the transaction above the
Court's traditional secondary priority rule. Although this section argues that
states are effectively precluded from circumventing the Supreme Court's dual-
priority framework, there is no constitutional barrier precluding Congress-
pursuant to its constitutionally delegated power to regulate interstate
commercel 98-from fashioning a framework that would more equitably
distribute unclaimed property receipts when an owner's last known address is
not maintained.
IV. TOWARD A UNIFORM, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ELEVATING THE
LOCATION OF THE TRANSACTION ABOVE THE CORPORATE HOLDER'S
STATE OF INCORPORATION
This Note proposes a congressional framework that would adopt the
location of the transaction that gave rise to the intangible property in question-
instead of the state of the corporate debtor's incorporation-as the default rule
when an owner's last known address is unknown or the state does not provide
for escheat of the intangible property in question. This scheme would more
closely approximate the core principles underlying the Texas v. New Jersey
decision and would present a more equitable means of resolving interstate
escheat disputes. Although the current dual-priority structure has existed for
nearly fifty years, this Note suggests that the current shift toward aggressive
enforcement of unclaimed property laws has increasingly pitted states against
one another for the right to claim abandoned intangible property. Further
straining the existing framework is society's increasing mobility and the
attendant difficulties associated with keeping up-to-date records of a holder's
last known address. These changes could not have been foreseen by the
Supreme Court when it decided Texas in 1965 and have substantial implications
for the frequency with which intangible property escheats to the debtor's state
of incorporation under the secondary priority rule.
Section A begins with the foundation for this comprehensive change,
highlighting the limitations of the Supreme Court as policymaker when
functioning as a court of original jurisdiction. Section B puts the state of
Delaware under the microscope, demonstrating that the reality that over sixty
198 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) ("We have
always recognized that federal common law is 'subject to the paramount authority of
Congress."' (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931))).
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percent of corporations are incorporated therein has led to tremendous financial
windfalls for the state never contemplated by the Court in Texas. Finally,
section C outlines the particulars of this proposed framework and identifies how
a retooling of the interstate priority rules would more equitably distribute
unclaimed property among the states while preserving the Texas decision's core
principles of equity and ease of administration.
A. The Impetus for a Comprehensive Scheme to Regulate Interstate
Escheat Disputes: The Limitations ofFunctioning as a Court of Original
Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has long recognized the inherent limitations of
functioning as a court of original jurisdictionl 99-an understanding that has led
the Court to do so highly infrequently.200 Language within the Court's opinion
in Texas implicitly suggests that it was acting outside of its traditional function
and under the necessity of resolving a growing controversy that the states were
without the constitutional power to settle. The Court conceded that it was called
upon to craft a rule of law within an arena in which it is not particularly well
versed: "[w]e realize that this case could have been resolved otherwise, for the
issue here is not controlled by statutory or constitutional provisions or by past
decisions, nor is it entirely one of logic."201 Instead, the Court adopted a rule
that it believed was "fair[], . . . easy to apply, and in the long run will be the
most generally acceptable to all the States." 202 Although the rule in Texas has
stood for nearly fifty years, a decision based upon "an individual Justice's views
as to what he might consider 'fair' or 'equitable' or 'expeditious"' 203 cannot be
insulated from reevaluation given the significant developments in unclaimed
property law since Texas was decided.
In the Supreme Court's most recent consideration of its interstate escheat
framework, the Court, in decidedly stronger language, again suggested that it
was not the most appropriate institution to resolve these types of disputes.
Justice Thomas-writing for the majority in Delaware v. New York-grounded
his opinion in stare decisis and declared his unwillingness to unseat Texas's
199 See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 761 (1981) ("The Court has wisely
insisted that original jurisdiction be sparingly invoked because it is not suited to functioning
as a nisi prius tribunal."); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971)
("This Court is . . . structured to perform as an appellate tribunal, ill-equipped for the task of
factfinding and so forced, in original [jurisdiction] cases, awkwardly to play the role of
factfinder without actually presiding over the introduction of evidence.").
200 See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972) ("It has long been this
Court's philosophy that 'our original jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly."' (quoting
Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969))).
201 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 683 (1965).
202 v2e
203 Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206, 216 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
550 [Vol. 74:3
INEQUITABLE ESCHEAT?
framework. 204 Toward the end of the opinion, and after rejecting the Special
Master's recommendation that the secondary priority rule should be displaced
by a "principal executive offices" presumption, the Court announced that "[i]f
the States are dissatisfied with the outcome of a particular case, they may air
their grievances before Congress. That body may reallocate abandoned property
among the States without regard to this Court's interstate escheat rules." 205
Effectively handcuffed by stare decisis, this Note argues-consistent with
Justice Thomas's admonition in Delaware-that Congress and not the courts is
the appropriate forum for modernizing the current interstate escheat framework.
B. Delaware: The Fortuitous Beneficiary Under the Current Dual-
Priority Framework
The state of Delaware derives substantial revenue from unclaimed property
obligations generated under both its state laws and the Supreme Court's
interstate escheat framework. 206 A state that was already well positioned during
the recent economic crisis, 207 Delaware's financial outlook is bright thanks-in
no small part-to the revenue it derives from the collection of abandoned
property. 208 Currently, abandoned property receipts are the state's third-largest
source of revenue behind income taxes and corporate franchise taxes. 209 In
204 Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 497-98, 510 (1993).205 Id. at 510.
206 See Peters & Beintum, supra note 110, at 29 ("In 1996, escheat of unclaimed
property boosted the state's general revenue fund by $76 million. In 2001, that number more
than doubled, to $163 million. By 2006, Delaware's unclaimed property added more than
$325 million to the state's coffers and grew to more than $375 million in 2008.").20 7 See, e.g., Oliff et al., supra note 1. Tables three through five within the report contain
state budget deficit information for the years 2009 through 2011. Id. at 5, 7. In each of the
three years, Delaware's total shortfall as a percentage of its general fund was well below the
national average. Id.
20 8 See DEFAC General Fund Revenue Worksheet, DEL. ECON. & FIN. ADVISORY
COUNCIL (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:41 AM), http://finance.delaware.gov/defac/decl2/revenues.pdf
At its December 17, 2012 meeting, the Delaware Economic and Financial Advisory Council
(DEFAC) projected abandoned property revenue of $566.5 million for fiscal year 2013 and
$514 million for fiscal year 2014. Id.; see also Governor's Financial Overview, FISCAL
YEAR 2014 OPERATING & CAP. BUDGET INFO. (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://budget.delaware.gov/fy2014/operating/vol 1/financial overview.pdf These projections
represent marked increases over the $427.9 million and $319.5 million in unclaimed
property revenue actually collected by the state in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. See Delaware
Fiscal Notebook 2012 Edition, ST. DEL. DEP'T FIN., 29 (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://finance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal notebook 12/fiscal notebook_12.pdf
[hereinafter, Delaware 2012 Fiscal Notebook].
209 Randall Chase, Delaware Among States Eyeing Unclaimed Property, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/
D9JMOU0O0.htm. This was not always the case, however. As recently as 1993, unclaimed
property revenue comprised only 2.4% of Delaware's yearly revenue, behind hospital board
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recent years, the state has come to rely heavily upon this source of income when
balancing its ledger.210
As was alluded to in previous sections, Delaware benefits heavily from
intangible debt obligations incurred all over the country by virtue of being the
state in which the majority of American businesses have historically
incorporated, and continue to do so today. 211 Under the Texas framework, in the
event that an owner's last known address is not reflected in the corporate
debtor's books and records, the debtor's state of incorporation-most often the
state of Delaware-is entitled to escheat. 212 Further enriching Delaware's
financial position are the aggressive estimation techniques wielded by state-
employed contingent-fee auditors.213 When a corporate debtor subject to audit
has not maintained its records long enough to satisfy a state's look-back period
the debtor's actual liability for this period is indeterminable and can then be
derived from statistical estimation.214 The absence of discernible owners
and treatment fees and inheritance taxes. Leslie, supra note 89, at 2 (referencing Delaware
Fiscal Notebook 2007 Edition, ST. DEL. DEP'T FIN., 21 (Oct. 31, 2007),
http://www.fmance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal notebook 07/SectionO2/sec2page2 1.
pdf). By 2004, Delaware's unclaimed property monies had overtaken the revenue derived
from the state lottery, bank franchise taxes, and business gross receipts taxes. Id. More
recently, unclaimed property revenue comprised 12.1% of Delaware's revenue in fiscal year
2011, and it is forecasted to increase to 16% by fiscal year 2013. See Delaware 2012 Fiscal
Notebook, supra note 208, at 29.
210 See Chase, supra note 209 ("Delaware officials are fighting to defend a key source of
revenue: abandoned property.") ("Abandoned property has become a pillar of the state's
budget.") ("'As a state, we're very fortunate to have this revenue source; it keeps taxes down
for our citizens,' said Delaware Finance Secretary Tom Cook."). Forty-two states and the
District of Columbia either closed or worked toward closing $103 billion in deficits for fiscal
year 2012. See Oliff et al., supra note 1. Conspicuously absent from this group was
Delaware, which did not face a budget shortfall in 2012. Id.
211 See, e.g., Del. Div. of Corps., DEP'T ST., http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Feb.
16, 2012) ("[M]ore than 900,000 business entities have their legal home in Delaware
including more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 63% of the Fortune
500.").
2 12 See supra notes 157-59; see also Dale Dallabrida, Delaware Lands Millions in
Unclaimed Property, NEWS J. (May 31, 1998), available at
http://daledallabrida.com/articles/unclaimed.htm (quoting state revenue director Bill
Remington saying, "It's not like every state gets this kind of money. Virtually all of it goes
to Delaware.") ("But Delaware's unique status as a corporate capital, which is largely behind
the state's unclaimed-property windfall, makes comparisons tough."); Bogoslaw, supra note
19 ("One reason the payouts [to the rightful owners] have been so few is that Delaware is
deluged with unknown owner property since 60% to 65% of the Fortune 1000 companies in
the U.S. are incorporated in Delaware.").2 13 See supra Part II.C.3.
214 Michael Houghton & Brenda Mayrack, Delaware's Unclaimed Property
Enforcement Continues to Evolve: Estimation and Equity, KEANOTES NEWSL. (Jan. 27,
2012), http://www.keaneunclaimedproperty.com/keanotes/winter-2012/delaware-unclaimed-
property-enforcement ("[Al significant portion of the unclaimed property revenue paid to
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effectively means that the unclaimed property obligations estimated during an
audit will never pass under the first priority rule-which requires knowledge of
an owner's last known address-becoming de facto revenue for the state of
incorporation. 215 For this reason, as states commence unclaimed property audits
with growing frequency, they increasingly funnel substantial sums of estimated
unclaimed property liability directly to the state of Delaware.
C. Fashioning a New Interstate Escheat Framework
This section endeavors to outline how a regulatory framework that elevates
the location of the transaction giving rise to the intangible property above the
state of corporate domicile might look, as well as to identify and substantiate
the advantages of this new regime. Although not bound by the Court's decision
in Texas, if Congress is to effectively supplant the current dual-priority
structure, its regulatory solution should be sensitive to the core principles that
underpinned the current escheat framework: equity and ease of administration.
1. Proposed Interstate Escheat Framework
This Note proposes a federal regulatory framework that would modify the
order of priority of the existing interstate rules originally articulated by the
Supreme Court in Texas, as well as incorporate the traditional third-priority
rule, in order to more equitably distribute unclaimed property obligations
incurred throughout the country. Under this framework, the first priority rule
under Texas-that the intangible property in question "is subject to escheat only
by the State of the last known address of the creditor, as shown by the debtor's
books and records" 216-would remain unchanged. Therefore, in the event that a
corporate holder of unclaimed property is in possession of the owner's last
known address, the state that encompasses this address should continue to
receive the benefit of the unclaimed property above all others.217
Second, the current secondary priority rule-which provides that the
intangible property in question is subject to escheat by the state of the holder's
incorporation 218-would be supplanted by a rule that looks to the location
where the relationship between creditor and debtor was formed. In other words,
Delaware has no identified owner... . Delaware derives the vast majority of its unclaimed
property revenue from estimations of holder liability, monies which the state can then spend.
as part of its annual budget because no owner will ever come forward to claim them.").2 15 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
216 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 682 (1965).
217 In this way, the rule maintains the equitable spirit of the Texas decision by
continuing to "recognize[] that the debt was an asset of the creditor," and therefore, the rule
would continue to "distribute escheats among the States in the proportion of the commercial
activities of their residents." Id. at 681.
218 See supra notes 157-59.
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this framework would elevate the traditional third-priority rule above the
current secondary rule, affording the benefit of escheat to the state
encompassing the location of the transaction that gave rise to the unclaimed
property at issue.
Finally, in an attempt to avoid a significant shortcoming of the Texas
framework-that it did not address a scenario in which both the primary and
secondary priority rules failed-the state of the holder's incorporation would
continue to exist as the tertiary priority rule under this proposed framework. By
permitting the state of incorporation to escheat intangible property in the highly
unlikely situation that the last known address and the location of the transaction
were not reflected within a corporate holder's books and records-or, in a
scenario where the unclaimed property statutes of either state entitled to escheat
under the primary and secondary rules do not provide for escheat of the
intangible property in question-this framework would eliminate any lingering
ambiguity, ensuring that the property escheats to a single state.
2. Advantages to a Location-Based Rule Not Found in the Current Dual-
Priority Structure
While respecting the principles that underpinned the Supreme Court's
decision in Texas-namely equity and ease of administration-this Note argues
that the framework tasked with achieving these ends should be refashioned to
account for the significant developments in unclaimed property law since 1965.
Firstly, a congressional framework that elevates the location of the original
debtor-creditor relationship above the state of incorporation when the primary
priority rule is inapplicable better "preserves the equitable foundation of the
Texas v. New Jersey rule." 219 By denying the state of the debtor's incorporation
the right to custodial escheat in the event that the last known address of the
creditor is unknown, this scheme would deny a windfall to a state simply
because of the unrelated coincidence that the holder happened to incorporate
therein. 220 Indeed, it was the fear of such a windfall that led the Court in Texas
to reject the state of New Jersey's domicile-of-the-debtor primary rule proposal
notwithstanding its "obvious virtues of clarity and ease of application." 221
Instead, the Court was more comfortable making the state of incorporation the
secondary rule because it was "conducive to needed certainty" and, more
importantly, because the Court foresaw it "aris[ing] with comparative
infrequency." 222 Because it has become a common occurrence for property to
escheat to a holder's state of incorporation 223-either because a corporate
219 Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206, 220 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
22 0 See Texas, 379 U.S. at 680.
221 Id
222Id. at 682.
22 3 See supra notes 212-15.
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debtor has not maintained the owner's last known address or because of the
increase in statistical estimation as an auditing technique-one of the most
significant assumptions upon which the Texas framework was predicated is no
longer applicable.
Additionally, elevating the location of the transaction above the state of
corporate domicile would further the Texas Court's equitable objective by
proportionally dividing the revenue derived from the escheat of unclaimed
intangible property based on an approximation of the number of transactions
occurring within each state. 224 In this way, the proposed framework would
maintain "the integrity of the notion that these amounts represent assets of the
individual purchasers or recipients of [the intangible property]." 225 Perhaps the
most fundamental problem with the current structure is its propensity to reward
a state with no relationship to the creditor, the property, or the underlying
transaction with a substantial financial benefit because of the unrelated
coincidence that the holder happened to incorporate therein. A framework that
places greater emphasis on the location of the original debtor-creditor
relationship would mitigate this inequity by permitting a state with far greater
ties to the underlying transaction to take custody of the property ahead of the
state of corporate domicile. 226
Finally, a secondary but important consideration is the administrablity of
this proposed framework. The Court in both Texas and Pennsylvania feared that
any room for case-by-case analysis would undermine the efficiency of the rule
and opted, instead, for a solution that was uniformly administrable. 227 A
224 See Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 218 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Also, in distributing the
property among the creditors' States, the rule had the advantage of dividing the property in a
manner roughly proportionate to the commercial activities of each State's residents."); id at
219 ("Yet the decision today .. .disregards the Court's clearly expressed intent that the
escheatable property be distributed in proportions roughly comparable to the volume of
transactions conducted in each state.").225 Id. at 220; Texas, 379 U.S. at 680.
226 Of course, in a world where debtor-creditor relationships are more frequently formed
in cyberspace than in a physical location readily confined to a single state's borders,
determining the location of the underlying transaction is more complicated. A congressional
framework emphasizing the location of the underlying transaction would require a set of
bright-line rules for determining the physical location upon which escheat would be
predicated. For example, Congress could determine that, within the retail context, the
appropriate "location" of the underlying transaction is the place where the payment was
processed, affording both retailers and the states with a clear-cut method of determining
which jurisdiction was entitled to take custody of the abandoned intangible property.
Although this solution would inevitably require some line-drawing, Congress-with its
ability to conduct hearings and solicit testimony from experts across numerous industries-
is the governmental body properly equipped to make these top-down determinations. I
would like to thank Jamie Ryan for a conversation that we had on this subject.
227 Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 221 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The majority adheres to the
existing rule because of some apprehension that flexibility in this case will deprive the Court
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location-based secondary priority rule would prove no more difficult to
administer, nor would it impose any greater burden on the states or corporate
debtors than the Court's current framework. In Texas, the Court was not overly
concerned by its rule that required looking to a corporate holder's books and
records to determine an owner's last known address.228 A framework requiring
an examination of the same records to determine the location of the underlying
transaction would present an equally minimal burden upon the corporate debtor
or upon a regulatory scheme tasked with deriving the information from the
debtor. In the event that a debtor's books and records did not contain the last
known address of the owner of an escheatable obligation, there is a strong
probability that they would still reflect such fundamental recordkeeping
information as the location where the relationship between creditor and debtor
was formed.
V. CONCLUSION
For too long, states where companies most frequently incorporate have
reaped the financial windfall of escheatable obligations incurred all over the
country. The Supreme Court in Texas v. New Jersey felt comfortable sacrificing
the potential for these financial windfalls in the interest of ease of
administration because of its understanding of the relative rarity in which the
primary rule might fail. Since states have become more fiscally constrained, the
potential financial benefits derived from unclaimed property have been fully
realized, and the population has become increasingly mobile, these windfalls
are no longer an unlikely theoretical shortcoming of the Court's dual-priority
framework, but an unfortunate practical reality. As the assumptions underlying
interstate escheat of unclaimed property have evolved, any framework under
which it operates must also adapt.
Congress should accept the Supreme Court's repeated invitations and craft a
uniform, regulatory framework that supplants the current secondary priority
rule-that when a corporate debtor's books and records do not reflect an
owner's last known address, the state of incorporation is entitled to escheat the
intangible property-with a rule that prioritizes the location of the transaction
that gave rise to the intangible property in question. While the Court is bound
by stare decisis and therefore unlikely to reconsider the dual-priority framework
that it has upheld on two occasions subsequent to Texas, there are no
impediments to an interstate escheat framework pursuant to Congress's
constitutionally delegated power to regulate interstate commerce. This proposed
of a satisfactory test for the resolution of future cases. The opinion anticipates that departure
from Texas . . . will leave other cases to be decided on an ad hoc basis. . . .").
228 Texas, 379 U.S. at 681 ("Such a solution would be in line with one group of cases
dealing with intangible property for other purposes in other areas of the law. Adoption of
such a rule involves a factual issue simple and easy to resolve .... ).
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framework, although ostensibly eschewing the dual-priority scheme articulated
by the Court in Texas, would no longer "exalt[] the rule but derogate[] the
reasons supporting it,"229 and would remain true to the core fundamental
principles underpinning the Court's decision: equity and ease of administration.
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